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Abstract
We study a coordination game motivated by the formation of Internet Exchange Points
(IXPs), in which agents choose which facilities to join. Joining the same facility as other agents
you communicate with has benefits, but different facilities have different costs for each agent.
Thus, the players wish to join the same facilities as their “friends”, but this is balanced by them
not wanting to pay the cost of joining a facility. We first show that the Price of Stability (PoS)
of this game is at most 2, and more generally there always exists an α-approximate equilibrium
with cost at most 2α of optimum. We then focus on how better stable solutions can be formed. If
we allow agents to pay their neighbors to prevent them from deviating (i.e., a player i voluntarily
pays another player j so that j joins the same facility), then we provide a payment scheme which
stabilizes the solution with minimum social cost s∗, i.e. PoS is 1. In our main technical result,
we consider how much a central coordinator would have to pay the players in order to form
good stable solutions. Let ∆ denote the total amount of payments needed to be paid to the
players in order to stabilize s∗, i.e., these are payments that a player would lose if they changed
their strategy from the one in s∗. We prove that there is a tradeoff between ∆ and the Price
of Stability: ∆cost(s∗) ≤ 1 − 25PoS. Thus when there are no good stable solutions, only a small
amount of extra payment is needed to stabilize s∗; and when good stable solutions already exist
(i.e., PoS is small), then we should be happy with those solutions instead. Finally, we consider
the computational complexity of finding the optimum solution s∗, and design a polynomial time
O(log n) approximation algorithm for this problem.
1 Introduction
We study a coordination game motivated by the formation of Internet Exchange Points (IXPs).
In this game, there are m facilities available, and the players (modeling ISPs, or more generally
entities which wish to exchange traffic with each other) choose which facilities to join. Joining a
facility fk has a cost for player i, which we call the “connection cost” and denote by w(i, fk); this
cost can be different for different players and facilities. The reason why players are willing to pay
such costs is because joining the same facility as other players is beneficial: a pair of players i and
j which do not connect to the same facility must pay a cost w(i, j), but if they share a facility
then this cost disappears. Finally, the facilities themselves have costs c(fk) which must be paid
for by the players using these facilities. In summary, the players wish to join the same facilities as
their “friends” in order to avoid paying the costs w(i, j), but this is counterbalanced by them not
wanting to pay the cost of joining a facility.
While our game is quite general, and models general group formation (e.g., facilities are clubs
or groups people can join, and they wish to join the same clubs as their friends), this game is
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specifically inspired by the formation of IXPs in the Internet. IXPs are facilities where Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) can exchange Internet traffic with high speed; a large fraction of total
Internet traffic flows through such hubs [1]. If two ISPs join the same IXP (and pay their cost for
joining, which can depend on many factors including the pricing scheme and the physical location(s)
of the IXP), then they gain the benefit of mutual high speed communication. If, however, two ISPs
do not use the same IXP, they must use alternate means of exchanging traffic with each other (e.g.,
through their providers or private peering), which we model by them incurring an extra cost w(i, j).
Coordination games have been widely studied in various situations where agents gain utility
by forming coalitions with other agents. Even with the large amount of existing work on both
coordination games and group formation, the questions we consider in this paper have not been
studied before for our game (see Related Work). Like many such games, ours can be represented by a
graph, in which each node stands for a player and the edges between them have weights representing
the disconnection cost for them not belonging to the same facility. One major difference between
our game and much (although certainly not all) of existing work is that the facilities (i.e., groups
that players can join) are not identical: their quality for a player i depends not only on who else has
joined the same group (as in hedonic games [10]), but also on the specific facility being joined, as
quantified by the cost w(i, fk). This immediately changes a lot about equilibrium structure: it is no
longer the case that everyone being in the same group is an equilibrium solution which minimizes
social cost; instead equilibrium solutions involve players balancing their cost for joining facilities
with their cost of being separated from their friends. Other coordination games look at cases where
only a limited number of facilities can be open, or when players have both “friends” and “enemies”
(i.e., w(i, j) can be negative); for the types of settings we consider, however, all facilities can open
as long as players are able to pay for them, and there is never any additional cost from two players
joining the same facility (i.e., w(i, j) ≥ 0). Moreover, unlike most other coordination games, we
assume that facilities have a cost which must be shared among the players using it, which adds a
significant layer of complexity to our results (for example, our game is no longer a potential game
[30]). For more details and comparison with existing work, see the Related Work section.
Our Contributions
In this paper, we study a coordination game where a strategy of an agent i is to choose a facility
fk to join, by paying a connection cost w(i, fk) (or to not join any facility). If two agents i, j do
not use the same facility, then both of them are charged a disconnection cost w(i, j). In addition,
there is a fixed facility cost c(fk) for each open facility, which is split among all agents using fk
according to an arbitrary pricing rule. An agent’s total social cost is the sum of its connection cost,
disconnection cost, and its share of the facility cost. An assignment with a pricing rule is stable if
it is budget balanced (each c(fk) is fully paid by all agents using fk), and no agent wants to switch
facilities, i.e., it is a Nash equilibrium.
We study the quality of equilibrium solutions for this game, as well as ways to create new
stable solutions. We first show that while the Price of Anarchy can be arbitrarily high, the Price of
Stability (PoS) is at most 2, and more generally there always exists an α-approximate equilibrium
with cost at most 2α of optimum. While we use potential arguments to prove this [33], note that
this game is not a potential game due to facility costs, and thus new proof techniques are needed
beyond simply defining a potential function. We then focus on how better stable solutions can be
formed. If we allow agents to pay their neighbors to prevent them from deviating (i.e., a player
i voluntarily pays another player j so that j joins the same facility), then we provide a payment
scheme which stabilizes the solution with minimum social cost s∗, i.e. PoS is 1. This is essentially
what occurs, for example, in paid peering [32], where two ISPs have different incentives, and so
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one ISP pays the other in order to form a peering connection. Finally, for our main result, we
consider how much a central coordinator would have to pay the players in order to form good
stable solutions, similarly to [2, 11]. Let ∆ denote the total amount of payments needed to be
paid to the players in order to stabilize s∗, i.e., these are payments that a player would lose if
they changed their strategy from the one in s∗. We prove that there is a tradeoff between ∆ and
the Price of Stability: ∆cost(s∗) ≤ 1 − 25PoS. [See Figure 1]. Thus when there are no good stable
solutions, only a small amount of extra payment is needed to stabilize s∗; and when good stable
solutions already exist (i.e., PoS is small), then we should be happy with those solutions instead!
This result is proven by forming several solutions where specific subsets of players perform their
best responses, and then showing that when a small amount of payment is not enough to stabilize
s∗, then at least one of these solutions is guaranteed to be better than s∗, giving a contradiction.
The difficulty here results from the fact that letting any single player move to their best response
strategy from s∗ could still result in solutions worse than s∗; to get a contradiction and form a
solution strictly better than s∗ requires changing the strategy of many players simultaneously.
Figure 1: Tradeoff between ∆ and PoS: ∆cost(s∗) ≤ 1− 25PoS.
The results above are for the setting where each agent can join at most one facility at a time. In
Section 6, we study the setting where each agent is allowed to use multiple facilities simultaneously.
Many of the results above still hold for this general mode, but only under the assumption that a
player can only switch their strategy by leaving one facility at a time (although it is allowed to join
multiple new facilities at once).
Finally, we consider the computational complexity of finding the optimum solution s∗. We
prove that computing it is NP-Hard (and in fact inapproximable to better than Ω(log n) unless
P=NP), and design a polynomial time approximation algorithm that gives a min{m+ 1, O(log n)}-
approximation to the optimal solution (with n being the number of players, and m the number of
facilities). We also provide a simple 2-approximation algorithm when all facility costs are zero.
2 Related Work
There is a very large amount of work on both group formation and coordination games, which is too
large to survey here. Hedonic games [10, 21] is an important class of games related to coordination
games, in which the agents form groups, and each agent’s utility only depends on the other agents
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in its own group, but is not affected by how agents are arranged in other groups. The objectives
are usually maximizing social welfare [3, 8, 9, 15, 23, 24] or minimizing social cost [23]. Often,
although not always, all players in a group have the same cost or utility. In much of the work, the
number of groups is fixed [12, 23, 25, 27]. There are also various utility/cost functions which have
been studied, with the most common one being that an agent’s utility is the total utility gained
from being with all other agents in its group. In fractional hedonic games [8, 13, 14], an agent’s
utility is the average value of its presence to every other agent in the group. More generally, there
are also other types of related group formation games, e.g., congestion games [19, 31] and profit
sharing games (see [4] and references therein), where an agent’s utility only depends on the size of
the group.
While coordination games can be considered a special case of general hedonic games, usually
coordination games involve players with some sort of graph structure, where for a pair of players,
being in the same group gives them both a benefit if they are “friends” (or a penalty if they are
“enemies”). This is in contrast to many hedonic games, where all players in a group have the
same utility, or the total utility of a group is somehow shared among its participants. In most
related work, either the objective functions of the players are very different from ours (e.g., they
depend on the number of players in their group) [3, 8, 16], or there are players who specifically
don’t want to be in the same group (“enemies”, negative-weight edges) [5, 12, 22], or all groups are
identical and the optimum solution would correspond to either everyone joining the same group or
everyone forming a group on their own [3, 9, 12, 15, 23, 22]. In contrast, our work is motivated by
settings where everyone would like to form one group together to reduce the disconnection cost,
but the complexity in the solution structure comes from the players trading this desire off with
their individual connection costs to (non-identical) facilities.
As discussed in the Introduction, general coordination games include other settings in which an
agent’s utility or cost also depends on which group it joins (i.e., the groups are not identical). Our
work is more closely related to this type of game. Using a graph representation, one can think of
such games as either Max-Uncut (maximize the weight of edges to friends in your group) or Min-Cut
(minimize the weight of edges to friends not in your group) objectives, but with additional utility
or cost depending on which group a player joins (which can be modeled using additional “anchor
nodes” which must belong to a specific group, see e.g., [2]). Work on such coordination games
with non-identical groups or facilities includes [2, 6, 18]. In k-Coloring games [17] each agent gains
utility by choosing a certain color/facility, and loses utility by choosing the same color as other
adjacent agents, i.e., they are anti-coordination games in which all agents want to be in different
groups if possible (see references in [17] for more discussion of such games). In generalized Discrete
Preference Games [5], there are exactly two groups, and the players could be friends or enemies.
Similar to hedonic games, the research in this area usually focused on properties of stable solutions,
e.g., [7] studies how a single agent could affect the Nash Equilibria converged from best responses,
and [6] compares the prices of anarchy and stability under different objective functions.
Perhaps the most related work to ours is [18], as it is also a Min-Cut game with non-identical
groups. The main differences between our work and [18] are: it is assumed in [18] that every
agent has a favorite group, and an agent’s cost depends on the distance between its current group
and favorite group, and the distances to its neighbors. We do not bind each agent’s cost with a
group in our setting. Suppose two agents have the same “favorite group” fk, which is the group
with the lowest connection cost to them; in our model their cost to any other group f ′k could be
very different. [18] also focuses on the setting where the group locations form a general metric
or tree metric, while we do not have such assumptions. Last but not least, unlike in the works
mentioned above, we assume there is a facility cost to open each facility, with different facilities
having different costs. We study stable states where the facility cost is split among the agents using
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it, so each facility is paid for, and each agent is stable with three types of costs: connection cost
to facility, its own share of facility cost, and disconnection cost to its neighbors that use different
facilities. We also study the case that each agent can join multiple groups. Finally, parts of our
work are also closely related to [2], which shows that an optimal solution could be stabilized by
providing a reasonable amount of payments to the agents, just as we do. Their model, however,
involves maximizing utility instead of minimizing costs (which changes the equilibrium structure
and all approximation factors like PoS and cost of stabilization entirely), and does not include any
facility costs.
3 Model and Preliminaries
We are given a set of m facilities F = {f1, f2, . . . , fm} and a set of n agents (which we will also
call “players”) A = {1, 2, . . . , n}. An agent i can use any facility fk by paying a connection cost
w(i, fk). A pair of agents (i, j) can form connections through facility fk if they are both using fk.
However, if i and j do not use the same facility, then both of them are charged a disconnection cost
w(i, j). A facility fk is open if and only if there exists an agent using it. There is a fixed facility
cost of c(fk) ≥ 0 for any open facility fk.
In much of this paper, we assume each agent uses at most one facility, so the strategy set of an
agent consists of F together with the empty set. A facility assignment s = {s1, s2, . . . , sn} denotes
the facilities that each agent uses: si denotes the facility that agent i uses in assignment s. In
the case that agent i does not use any facility, let si = ∅ and w(i, si) = 0. A pricing strategy
γ = {γ1, γ2, . . . , γn} assigns the price for using each facility fk to every agent i. γi(fk) is a non-
negative number that denotes agent i’s share of the facility cost for using fk. (s, γ) is a state with
assignment s and pricing strategy γ. Note that agent i only pays its share of the facility cost to fk
if i uses fk, i.e., γi(fk) > 0 only if si = fk.
To summarize, the total cost of agent i in a state (s, γ) is the sum of the following three parts:
1. If i uses facility fk, then there is a connection cost w(i, fk) to i.
2. For each agent j that do not use si, i.e., si 6= sj , there is a disconnection cost w(i, j) to both
i and j. A special case is when both i and j are not using any facility: although si = ∅ and
sj = ∅, we still say that si 6= sj in this case to make it consistent that the disconnection cost
w(i, j) is charged to both i and j if si 6= sj .
3. If i uses facility fk, then there is a facility cost γi(fk) to i.
We denote the total cost of agent i as ci(s, γ). Summing up the three types of cost mentioned
above:
ci(s, γ) = w(i, si) +
∑
j|si 6=sj
w(i, j) + γi(si)
For convenience, we denote the cost of agent i without facility cost as c˜i(s):
c˜i(s) = w(i, si) +
∑
j|si 6=sj
w(i, j)
In this paper, we are interested in the social cost of stable states. The total social cost of a state
(s, γ) equals the sum of ci(s, γ), plus the total cost of all open facilities. For each facility fk, the
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cost is c(fk) minus the sum of γi(fk) of each agent using fk, i.e., c(fk) −
∑
i|si=fk γi(fk). In other
words, one can think of each facility as an agent with cost c(fk), and with other agents paying it
the prices γi(fk) for using it. The sum of γi(fk) cancels out, and the total social cost is actually
the sum of c˜i(s) plus the sum of c(fk) of open facilities:
c(s) =
∑
fk∈F ,fk is open
c(fk) +
∑
i∈A
(w(i, si) +
∑
j|si 6=sj
w(i, j))
=
∑
fk∈F ,fk is open
c(fk) +
∑
i∈A
w(i, si) +
∑
i∈A
∑
j|si 6=sj
w(i, j)
=
∑
fk∈F ,fk is open
c(fk) +
∑
i∈A
w(i, si) + 2
∑
(i,j)|si 6=sj
w(i, j)
We consider (i, j) as an unordered pair, therefore in
∑
i∈A
∑
j|si 6=sj w(i, j), each unordered pair
(i, j) that si 6= sj is counted twice.
In this paper, we study the game in which each agent’s goal is to minimize its total social
cost, and the central coordinator’s goal is to find a budget balanced and stable state (s, γ) that
(approximately) minimizes the total social cost. A state is budget balanced if each facility fk is
fully paid with the facility cost c(fk), formally:
Definition 3.1. A state (s, γ) is budget balanced if for each facility fk,
∑
i|si=fk γi(fk) = c(fk).
Before defining the stability of a state, we first define an agent’s best response. Consider an
agent i with current strategy si = fk, and price γi(fk) for using this facility. The agent may
consider switching to a different facility f`, but to correctly evaluate their cost after this switch,
the agent needs to know exactly how much they will pay after such a switch. We assume that the
agents know their connection costs w(i, f`) and their disconnection costs from other agents, as well
as which agents are using each facility. What price γi(f`), however, should they anticipate after
switching to their new facility? If the prices depend on the set of agents (or the number of agents)
at the facility, then the price might change from the current one being offered. But how reasonable
is it for agents to know the exact details of the pricing schemes used by the facilities (which are
modeling IXP’s or other private enterprises which do not want to reveal their pricing structures)?
To address these issues, in this paper, every agent assumes it will be charged 0 facility cost
for joining a new facility. This allows us to not worry about what an agent may know and what
price they may anticipate after switching a facility. As the same time, this assumption does not
limit our results on stable solutions. This is because no matter what price γi(f`) an agent may
anticipate after switching to facility f`, anticipating a price of 0 instead will make it only more
likely to switch. Thus, no matter what the agents’ beliefs for prices after switching make sense for
a particular setting, a stable solution in our model will still be stable no matter what beliefs about
prices γi(f`) the agents hold, or what price they will actually be charged after switching. Thus
our results about stable solutions are stronger: they state that even if the agents are
extremely optimistic and believe they can switch to any facility without paying facility
cost, then there still exist good stable solutions. If they assumed costs higher than 0, then
the set of stable solutions would only increase. In other words, if an agent is stable when assuming
it will be charged 0 for joining other facilities, then it would also be stable with a higher cost as
well.
Definition 3.2. Given a state (s, γ), s′i is agent i’s best response if ∀s′′i 6= s′i, c˜i(s′i, s−i)+ γˆi(s′i) ≤
c˜i(s
′′
i , s−i), where γˆi(s
′
i) = γi(si) if s
′
i = si, and γˆi(s
′
i) = 0 otherwise. We denote i’s best response
at state (s, γ) as BRi(s, γ).
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In the definition above, γˆi is the pricing strategy that agent i assumes would happen after its
deviation. If agent i stays at its current facility, then its share of the facility cost does not change.
But if i leaves its current facility and joins another one, then it believes that it will be charged 0
facility cost for joining the new facility.
Definition 3.3. Agent i is stable at state (s, γ) if for any strategy s′i 6= si :
ci(s, γ) ≤ c˜i(s′i, s−i).
In other words, agent i is stable at (s, γ) if si is i’s best response at (s, γ).
We define a state (s, γ) to be stable if it is budget balanced, and every agent is stable. Intuitively,
if a state is not budget balanced, then a facility would not cover its operating cost c(fk), and thus
would not choose to remain open.
Definition 3.4. A state (s, γ) is stable if it is budget balanced, and for each agent i, for any
strategy s′i 6= si :
ci(s, γ) ≤ c˜i(s′i, s−i).
Denote an assignment with the minimum total social cost as s∗. Our goal is to find stable states
(s, γ) to approximate the minimum total social cost. We use Price of Stability (PoS) to quantify
the quality of a stable state. Given an instance, suppose (sˆ, γ) is the stable state with the smallest
total social cost, then PoS is the worst case ratio between c(sˆ) and c(s∗) for any instance. A related
concept, Price of Anarchy (PoA) is defined as: suppose (sˆ, γ) is the stable state with the largest
total social cost, then PoA is the worst case ratio between c(sˆ) and c(s∗) for any instance. So PoS
shows the quality of the best stable state, while PoA shows the quality of the worst stable state.
3.1 Pricing Strategies and Stability
Recall a state (s, γ) is stable if it is budget balanced, and every agent i is stable. Suppose there
is no other constraint on the pricing strategy, then we ask the following question in order to find
a budget balanced state: in an assignment s, how much facility cost can we charge an agent while
keeping it stable? To answer this question, we first define a special type of best response: with an
assignment s, let BRi(s) denote i’s best response, given i is forced to stop using si. In other words,
it is the strategy s′i 6= si with the smallest c˜i(s′i, s−i). Note that if BRi(s, γ) 6= si, i.e., if i wants
to switch from the state (s, γ), then BRi(s, γ) = BRi(s). But in the case when i’s best response
is to stay at its current strategy, BRi(s) would denote the “next best choice” if i is forced to stop
using its current facility. Intuitively, the “value” of facility si to agent i is how much i’s cost would
increase if i is forced to leave si and join the next best choice BRi(s). If there are multiple strategies
that all satisfy the definition of BRi(s), then we choose an arbitrary one except in one case: we
never choose a facility that is closed in s as BRi(s). We can always do this because if there exists
such strategy s′i, such that s
′
i is a closed facility in s, then compare c˜i(∅, s−i) with c˜i(s′i, s−i). The
connection cost in c˜i(∅, s−i) is 0, and the disconnection cost is the same as in c˜i(s′i, s−i), because i
would be the only agent using s′i. So it must be c˜i(∅, s−i) ≤ c˜i(s′i, s−i), and we define BRi(s) = ∅
in this case. For every agent i in assignment s, define Qi(s) = c˜i(BRi(s), s−i)− c˜i(s); it is not hard
to see that agents would be willing to pay this price in order to use facility si.
Note that some agents might be unstable even with 0 facility cost, so we also consider the case
that agents need to receive payments to be stable. Let ∆i denote a payment that agent i receives if
it does not deviate at state (s, γ), and denote the total payments as ∆ =
∑
i ∆i. In this paper, the
default setting is that agents do not receive payments (∆i = 0), but we do consider the cases that
agents are allowed to be paid by a central coordinator in Section 5.2 or paid by their neighbors in
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Section 5.1. Then we define the stability with payments as follows: a state (s, γ) with payments ∆
is stable if it is budget balanced, and for each agent i, for any strategy s′i 6= si :
ci(s, γ)−∆i ≤ c˜i(s′i, s−i)
We now show that agent i is stable if γi(si)−∆i ≤ Qi(s).
Lemma 3.0.1. Given any assignment s, pricing strategy γ, and payments to agents ∆, agent i is
stable if γi(si)−∆i ≤ Qi(s).
Proof. With γi(si)−∆i ≤ Qi(s), by the definition of agent i’s total cost and Qi(s):
ci(s, γ)−∆i = c˜i(s) + γi(s)−∆i
≤ c˜i(s) +Qi(s)
= c˜i(s) + c˜i(BRi(s), s−i)− c˜i(s)
= c˜i(BRi(s), s−i)
By the definition of BRi(s), for any s
′
i 6= si:
c˜i(BRi(s), s−i) ≤ c˜i(s′i, s−i)
Thus, i is stable.
4 Single Facility per Agent: Price of Stability
In the first part of this paper, we show our results in the setting that each agent uses at most one
facility.
4.1 Facility cost c(fk) = 0 for every fk
In this section, we provide simple baseline results for the case that there is no facility cost. Set
the pricing strategy to be γi(fk) = 0 for any agent i and facility fk, so all solutions are budget
balanced. In this special case, for any agent i in assignment s, we have ci(s, γ) = c˜i(s). A state s
is stable if for each agent i and strategy s′i, c˜i(s) ≤ c˜i(s′i, s−i).
Define potential function Φ˜(s) as:
Φ˜(s) =
∑
i∈A
w(i, si) +
∑
(i,j)|si 6=sj
w(i, j)
When an agent i switches its strategy from si to s
′
i, it is easy to see that the change of i’s cost
is captured exactly by the change of Φ˜(s), so Φ˜(s) is an exact potential function.
Theorem 4.1. If ∀k, c(fk) = 0, then price of stability is at most 2 and this bound is tight.
Proof. With the above definition of Φ˜(s), when an agent i switches its strategy from si to s
′
i, it is
easy to see that the change of i’s cost is captured exactly by the change of Φ˜(s):
c˜i(s
′
i, s−i)− c˜i(s) = Φ˜(s′i, s−i)− Φ˜(s)
Thus, Φ˜(s) is an exact potential function.
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The total social cost in this case is:
c(s) =
∑
i∈A
w(i, si) + 2
∑
(i,j)|si 6=sj
w(i, j)
Consider the assignment sˆ that minimizes Φ˜. sˆ must be stable, because the exact potential
function Φ˜ is minimized, so no agent could deviate to lower its cost. Bound the social cost of sˆ:
c(sˆ) =
∑
i∈A
w(i, sˆi) + 2
∑
(i,j)|sˆi 6=sˆj
w(i, j)
≤ 2Φ˜(sˆ)
< 2Φ˜(s∗)
≤ 2c(s∗)
So PoS is at most 2.
Consider an example with one facility and two agents. w(1, f1) = 0, w(2, f1) = 1+, w(1, 2) = 1.
The only stable state is agent 1 and 2 both do not use fk, i.e., si 6= sj , since agent 2 will always
want to switch to that state. When  approaches 0, PoS approaches 2, since the cost of the stable
state is 2 (both agents have a disconnection cost of 1), and the cost of optimum is 1 + .
Theorem 4.2. The price of anarchy is unbounded in our setting.
Proof. Consider an example with one facility and two agents. w(1, f1) = 0, w(2, f1) = 0, w(1, 2) =
1. In an assignment s that agent 1 and 2 do not connect to any facility, c(s) = 2w(1, 2) = 2, while
the optimal solution has c(s∗) = 0. This is a stable state since no single agent can reduce their cost
without the other agent connection to the facility as well.
4.2 Price of Stability for arbitrary facility costs c(fk)
In this section, we consider the case that for each fk, the facility cost c(fk) is a fixed constant when
fk is open, regardless of how many agents/connections are using fk. We suppose there is a central
coordinator to determine the pricing strategy γ that is budget balanced, with no other constraint
on γ.
Note that Φ˜(s) is not a potential function in this setting any more, because agent i also considers
the facility cost γi(si) when it deviates to decrease ci(s). Thus, Φ˜(s) does not always decrease when
i deviates. We define another potential function Φ(s):
Φ(s) =
∑
fk|fk is open
c(fk) +
∑
i∈A
w(i, si) +
∑
(i,j)|si 6=sj
w(i, j)
=
∑
fk|fk is open
c(fk) + Φ˜(s)
We cannot use the potential method [33] to analyze the price of stability in our game directly;
in fact our game is not a potential game. For this new potential function Φ(s), a player could still
deviate to lower its cost, while the potential increases. The following lemma, however, shows that
when a player deviates and decreases its cost c˜i(s) (but not necessarily decreases cost ci(s, γ)), then
Φ(s) does in fact decrease.
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Lemma 4.2.1. In an assignment s, if any agent i switches its strategy to s′i such that c˜i(s
′
i, s−i) <
c˜i(s) and s
′
i does not contain any closed facility in s, then Φ(s
′
i, s−i) < Φ(s).
Proof. First, Φ˜(s) is an exact potential function when there is no facility cost, so Φ˜(s′i, s−i) < Φ˜(s)
when c˜i(s
′
i, s−i) < c˜i(s). Also, because s
′
i does not contain any closed facility in s, then there is
no new facility open in (s′i, s−i) compared to s, and the total facility cost
∑
fk|fk is open c(fk) is
non-increasing compared to that in s. Thus, Φ(s′i, s−i) < Φ(s).
Now we use the above potential to prove bounds on the price of stability. While a single player
changing its strategy to decrease its cost might actually increase the value of the potential Φ(s), we
give a series of coalitional deviations (i.e., groups of players switching strategies simultaneously) so
that the potential is guaranteed to decrease after each such deviation, and so that the cost of the
resulting stable solution is not too large.
Theorem 4.3. The price of stability is at most 2, and this bound is tight. In other words, there
exists a stable state (s, γ) with cost at most twice that of optimum.
Proof. We define a coalitional deviation process that converges to a stable state, with Φ(s) decreas-
ing in each step of the process.
Start with the optimal assignment s∗. If there exists an agent i such that when i switches to
a strategy s′i, in which s
′
i does not contain any closed facility in s
∗, then c˜i(s′i, s
∗
−i) < c˜i(s
∗), then
let agent i switch to s′i. Select another agent to repeat this process until no such agent exists. In
other words, each agent is now stable if they assume they are not charged any facility cost. By
Lemma 4.2.1, Φ(s) decreases during each step in this process. Let s be the current state.
We know that no agent i can decrease c˜i(s) by switching to another strategy that does not
contain any closed facility in s. Note that even if i switches to a closed facility in s, it would not be
able to lower c˜i(s). This is because if i switches to a closed facility fk, i will pay a connection cost
of w(i, fk), and because i is the only agent using fk, so i’s disconnection cost would not decrease.
Thus, in this “stable” state, every agent is stable if it is charged 0 facility cost. By Lemma 3.0.1,
for any agent i that uses fk, we can charge Qi(s) to agent i while keeping it stable:
Qi(s) = c˜i(BRi(s), s−i)− c˜i(s)
= w(i, BRi(s)) +
∑
j|sj=fk
w(i, j)− w(i, fk)−
∑
j|sj=BRi(s)
w(i, j) (1)
For each facility fk, consider the following two cases:
Case 1, c(fk) >
∑
i|si=fk Qi(s). c(fk) is greater than the total payments we can charge all
agents using fk while keeping them stable. In this case, we close fk and let each agent i using fk in
s switch its strategy BRi(s). Denote the assignment after closing fk as s
′, then consider the value
change of Φ(s):
Φ(s′)− Φ(s) = −c(fk) +
∑
i|si=fk
(w(i, BRi(s))− w(i, fk))
+
∑
(i,j)|si=sj=fk,s′i 6=s′j
w(i, j)−
∑
(i,j)|si 6=sj ,s′i=s′j
w(i, j)
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Note that only agents using fk in s change their strategies, and all other agents keep their
strategies at s. Thus, the newly disconnected agent pairs in s′ are at most all the connected pairs
using fk in s:
∑
(i,j)|si=sj=fk,s′i 6=s′j
w(i, j) ≤
∑
(i,j)|si=sj=fk
w(i, j)
=
1
2
∑
i|si=fk
∑
j|sj=fk
w(i, j)
≤
∑
i|si=fk
∑
j|sj=fk
w(i, j)
Also, the newly connected agent pairs in s′ are at least those created by the agents in fk
deviating to their BRi(s), i.e., ∑
(i,j)|si 6=sj ,s′i=s′j
w(i, j) ≥
∑
i|si=fk
∑
j|sj=BRi(s)
w(i, j)
With the condition of Case 1 and Equation 1, we can bound Φ(s′)− Φ(s) by:
Φ(s′)− Φ(s)
= −c(fk) +
∑
i|si=fk
(w(i, BRi(s)− w(i, fk)) +
∑
(i,j)|si=sj=fk,s′i 6=s′j
w(i, j)−
∑
(i,j)|si 6=sj ,s′i=s′j
w(i, j)
≤ −c(fk) +
∑
i|si=fk
(w(i, BRi(s)− w(i, fk)) +
∑
i|si=fk
∑
j|sj=fk
w(i, j)−
∑
i|si=fk
∑
j|sj=BRi(s)
w(i, j)
= −c(fk) +
∑
i|si=fk
(w(i, BRi(s)) +
∑
j|sj=fk
w(i, j)− w(i, fk)−
∑
j|sj=BRi(s)
w(i, j))
= −c(fk) +
∑
i|si=fk
(c˜i(BRi(s), s−i)− c˜i(s))
= −c(fk) +
∑
i|si=fk
Qi(s)
< 0
Thus, Φ(s) decreases after fk is closed and every agent i using it switches its strategy to BRi(s).
Then repeat the above two steps: let agents switch strategies to reach a “stable” state s that
there is no agent i could switch its strategy to s′i, in which s
′
i does not contain any closed facility
in s and c˜i(s
′
i, s−i) < c˜i(s). Then if there exist a facility fk that satisfies the condition in Case 1,
we close fk and let every agent i using it switch its strategy to BRi(s). We repeat these two steps
until we reach state s that every agent is “stable”, and every open facility does not satisfy Case
1. Note that Φ(s) decreases in each step, so this process always converges to such an assignment
s. Then each open facility must satisfy the following Case 2:
Case 2, c(fk) ≤
∑
i|si=fk Qi(s). In this case, we set γi(fk) = Qi(s) for each agent i. By
Lemma 3.0.1, every agent is stable with γi(fk) = Qi(s). Also, by definition, Qi(s) = c˜i(BRi(s), s−i)−
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c˜i(s). Because every agent is stable without considering facility costs, so c˜i(s) ≤ c˜i(BRi(s), s−i),
then we are charging a non-negative facility cost to each agent. By the condition of Case 2,∑
i|si=fk γi(fk) ≥ c(fk). If
∑
i|si=fk γi(fk) > c(fk), then to get a budget-balanced cost assignment,
we can lower the facility cost of some agents to make the sum of γi(fk) exactly c(fk), because the
agents would not deviate with γi(fk), then they would not deviate will a lower facility cost. Thus,
we have reached a stable state.
Φ(s) decreases in each deviation, so it is an ordinal potential function for our deviation processes.
The total social cost is:
c(s) =
∑
fk|fk is open
c(fk) +
∑
i∈A
w(i, si) + 2
∑
(i,j)|si 6=sj
w(i, j)
Denote the final stable state as sˆ. Similar to the analysis in Theorem 4.1,
c(sˆ) ≤ 2Φ(sˆ) < 2Φ(s∗) ≤ 2c(s∗)
Thus, PoS is at most 2.
See Theorem 4.1 for the lower bound example showing this bound is tight (even if c(fk) = 0).
The above price of stability result can be easily generalized to approximately stable solutions
as well. We say a state (s, γ) is α-approximate stable if it is budget balanced, and no agent could
deviate to lower its cost to 1α of its current cost:
Definition 4.1. A state (s, γ) is α-approximate stable if it is budget balanced, and for each
agent i, for any strategy s′i 6= si :
ci(s, γ) ≤ α · c˜i(s′i, s−i)
Theorem 4.4. There always exists an α-approximate stable state (sˆ, γ) such that c(sˆ)c(s∗) ≤ 2α .
Proof. For any assignment s, consider the following potential function:
Φα(s) =
∑
i∈A
w(i, si) + α
∑
(i,j)|si 6=sj
w(i, j) +
∑
fk∈F|fk is open
The proof is essentially the same as that of Theorem 4.3, except agent i only would like to
deviate from assignment s to s′ if ci(s′) < 1αci(s), and the potential used is the one above.
Remember the total social cost is:
c(s) =
∑
i∈A
w(i, si) + 2
∑
(i,j)|si 6=sj
w(i, j) +
∑
fk∈F|fk is open
Thus, if we start from s∗, proceed with our coalitional deviation process to form an α-approximate
Equilibrium (sˆ, γ), and make sure Φα(s) is non-increasing in each step, then
c(sˆ)
c(s∗) ≤ 2α .
This theorem implies that, in particular, the optimum solution s∗ is a 2-approximate stable
state, i.e., no player can improve their cost by more than a factor of 2 by switching its facility.
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5 Payments to Form Good Stable Solutions
5.1 Agents paying each other: “Paid peering”
In this section, we consider the case that agents can pay each other to stabilize the optimal as-
signment. Formally, for a pair (i, j) such that si = sj = fk, i can pay j up to w(i, j) in order to
discourage j from leaving facility fk and thus disconnecting from i. Given the asymmetry of agent
costs (due to connection costs), it may make sense for agents to give their “friends” extra incentives
to connect with them using a particular facility. Of course, agent i would never voluntarily pay
agent j more than j’s value to i, i.e., more than w(i, j). Such payments make sense in general
settings of group formation, and make sense in our motivating IXP setting as well: when two ISP’s
decide to make a peering arrangement to exchange traffic after joining a common IXP, it is often
the case that they make a paid peering contract [32], in which one ISP pays the other for the traffic
exchange, thus giving it extra incentive to remain connected to their joint facility.
Let pij denote the payments that agent i pays its neighbor j to discourage it from leaving the
facility they share. pij ≥ 0 means i pays j, and pij < 0 means i receives payment from j. For
any pair of agents (i, j), we have pji = −pij . In this section, ∆i denotes the total payments that
agent i receives from its neighbors minus the total payments i pays its neighbors. In other words,
∆i =
∑
j|si=sj pji. We abuse the notation to allow ∆i to be negative, in which case i pays more
than receives from its neighbors. We consider stability with payments defined in Section 3.1. It is
easy to see that Lemma 3.0.1 still holds with this modified definition of ∆i.
In the optimal assignment s∗ with a pricing strategy γ, consider the stability of every agent
using fk: by Lemma 3.0.1, we know every agent i would be stable if γi(s
∗
i ) − ∆i ≤ Qi(s∗). For
a pair of agents (i, j) using fk in s
∗, suppose Qi(s∗) ≥ 0, and Qj(s∗) < 0, which means we can
get some payments from i (to pay the facility or its neighbors) while keeping it stable, but j needs
to be paid to become stable at s∗. Thus, it makes sense for i to pay j to stop it from deviating,
but i would not pay more than w(i, j), which is the maximum increase of i’s cost as a result of j’s
deviation.
Theorem 5.1. If we allow agents to pay their neighbors, and i pays j no more than w(i, j), then
there exist γ and payments of players to each other so that the resulting solution (s∗, γ) is stable,
with s∗ being the solution minimizing social cost. In other words, the price of stability becomes 1.
Proof. We construct a circulation network [29] for each facility fk as follows: start from the optimal
assignment s∗. Create a node for each agent i such that s∗i = fk, and we set a supply of Qi(s
∗)
to it (note that this value might be negative, in which case the node has a demand instead of
supply). For each pair of agents (i, j), we create directed edges from i to j and from j to i, both
with capacity w(i, j). Create a node fk with a supply of −c(fk) and an edge from each node to fk
with infinite capacity. Finally, create a dummy node z with a demand of the sum of supplies of all
other nodes, and add an edge from fk to z with infinite capacity. This is to make sure the total
supply equals the total demand in the network.
Suppose there is a feasible solution, i.e., a valid circulation which satisfies all the supplies and
demands, and obeys the capacities of the edges. Then we can use the flow on each edge to create
a stable state, as follows. First, denote the flow from any node i to j as vij . For each pair of nodes
i and j such that s∗i = s
∗
j = fk, set pij = vij − vji and pji = vji − vij . Also, for every agent i
such that s∗i = fk, set γi(fk) = vifk . A feasible solution guarantees that facility fk is fully paid for,
because
∑
i|s∗i =fk γi(fk) =
∑
i|s∗i =fk vifk ≥ c(fk). Also, every agent is stable. To see this, first, by
the definition of ∆i in this section, ∆i =
∑
j|s∗i =s∗j pji =
∑
j|s∗i =s∗j (vji − vij). For agent i such that
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s∗i = fk, the supply of node i is Qi(s
∗), which equals the total flow going out of i minus the total
flow going into i:
Qi(s
∗) = vifk +
∑
j|s∗i =s∗j=fk
(vij − vji) = γi(fk)−∆i.
By Lemma 3.0.1, every agent i is stable if γi(s
∗
i )−∆i = Qi(s∗), so every agent is stable.
To prove the theorem, all we need to show is that this circulation network is feasible. By
a standard Max-Flow and Min-Cut analysis [29], if for every subset of nodes in the circulation
network, the total supply of the subset plus the total capacity of edges going into the subset is
non-negative, then the circulation network is feasible. We now argue that this is true.
First consider any subset that includes z. If the subset does not include fk, then there must be
an edge with infinite capacity going into the subset, so the conclusion holds.
Next, consider a subset that includes fk and z. If the subset does not include all agents in fk,
then there must be an edge with infinite capacity going into the subset, so the conclusion holds. If
the subset does include all agents in fk, then by the definition of z, the total supply is 0.
Then, consider a subset that includes fk but not z. If the subset does not include all agents in
fk, the conclusion still holds. If the subset is actually all the nodes in the network, then the total
supply is: ∑
i∈A
Qi(s
∗)− c(fk),
and there are no incoming edges into this set of nodes. Suppose for the sake of forming a contra-
diction, that the total supply is negative. Then consider an assignment s′ such that fk is closed,
and every agent i that uses fk in s
∗ switches its strategy to BRi(s∗). For any agent j that does not
use fk in s
∗, j stays at s∗j . It it easy to see that c˜j(s
′) ≤ c˜j(s∗) for every j such that s∗j 6= fk. For
any agent i with s∗i = fk, it must be c˜i(s
′) ≤ c˜i(BRi(s∗), s∗−i). This is because c˜i(BRi(s∗), s∗−i) is
the cost if only i switches to BRi(s
∗) while all other agents stay at s∗, while in s′ all agents using
fk switch their strategies. Because agents using BRi(s
∗) in s∗ all stay at s∗, i would not get any
“unexpected cost” in s′, so c˜i(s′) ≤ c˜i(BRi(s∗), s∗−i). Also, because fk is closed in s′, the facility
cost decreases by at least c(fk). No new facility will open in s
′ (compared to s∗) because we have
excluded this possibility in the definition of BRi(s
∗). Thus, the total social cost of s′ increases by
at most:
−c(fk) +
∑
i|s∗i =fk
(c˜i(BRi(s
∗), s∗−i)− c˜i(s∗)) = −c(fk) +
∑
i|s∗i =fk
Qi(s
∗).
By our assumption, this number is negative, which means s′ has less total cost than s∗, which
contradicts the fact that s∗ is optimal. Thus, the total supply must be non-negative.
Finally, consider a subset of nodes that does not include fk. Suppose there exists a subset B,
such that the total supply of nodes in B plus the total capacity of edges going into the subset is
negative, i.e.,
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∑
i∈B
Qi(s
∗) +
∑
i∈B,j /∈B,s∗j=fk
w(i, j) < 0
∑
i∈B
[w(i, BRi(s
∗)) +
∑
s∗j=fk,j 6=i
w(i, j)− w(i, fk)−
∑
s∗j=BRi(s∗)
w(i, j)] +
∑
i∈B,j /∈B,s∗j=fk
w(i, j) < 0
∑
i∈B
w(i, BRi(s
∗)) +
∑
i∈B
∑
s∗j=fk,j 6=i
w(i, j)−
∑
i∈B
w(i, fk)−
∑
i∈B
∑
s∗j=BRi(s∗)
w(i, j) +
∑
i∈B,j /∈B,s∗j=fk
w(i, j) < 0
(2)
Decompose
∑
i∈B
∑
s∗j=fk,j 6=iw(i, j) into two parts (j ∈ B or j /∈ B):
∑
i∈B
∑
s∗j=fk,j 6=i
w(i, j) =
∑
i∈B
(
∑
j∈B,s∗j=fk,j 6=i
w(i, j) +
∑
j /∈B,s∗j=fk
w(i, j))
=
∑
i∈B
∑
j∈B,j 6=i
w(i, j) +
∑
i∈B
∑
j /∈B,s∗j=fk
w(i, j)
= 2
∑
i,j∈B
w(i, j) +
∑
i∈B,j /∈B,s∗j=fk
w(i, j)
Remember we only create nodes for every agent j such that s∗j = fk, and B is a subset of the
nodes, so {j ∈ B, s∗j = fk, j 6= i} = {j ∈ B, j 6= i} in the first line of the inequality above.
Together with Inequality 2,∑
i∈B
w(i, BRi(s
∗)) + 2
∑
i,j∈B
w(i, j) + 2
∑
i∈B,j /∈B,s∗j=fk
w(i, j)−
∑
i∈B
w(i, fk)−
∑
i∈B
∑
s∗j=BRi(s∗)
w(i, j) < 0
Which is equivalent to:∑
i∈B
w(i, BRi(s
∗)) + 2
∑
i,j∈B
w(i, j) + 2
∑
i∈B,j /∈B,s∗j=fk
w(i, j) <
∑
i∈B
w(i, fk) +
∑
i∈B
∑
s∗j=BRi(s∗)
w(i, j) (3)
Consider an assignment s′: start from s∗ and let every agent i in B switch to BRi(s∗). The
total facility cost of s′ is no more than in s∗ because no agent would switch to a closed facility in
s∗ by the definition of BRi(s∗). The total connection and disconnection cost in s′ compared to s∗
increases by at most the left hand side of Inequality 3, and decreases by the right hand side of it.
Thus the total social cost of s′ is less than s∗, which is a contradiction, and so such a subset B
does not exist. Since we have now proven that the circulation network is feasible, this completes
the proof of the theorem.
Theorem 5.2. Let s∗ be a solution with minimum social cost. Then, doubling the disconnection
costs makes s∗ become a stable solution.
Proof. Consider the circulation network we constructed in the proof of Theorem 5.1, suppose we
are given a feasible circulation, and denote the flow from any node i to j as vij . Between any pair
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of agents i and j, define f(i, j) = |vij − vji|, which is the absolute value difference of flow between
i and j. Intuitively, if there exist flows both from i to j and j to i, we cancel out the flow in
one direction. Next, we increase the disconnection cost between i and j by f(i, j). Denote the
new disconnection cost as d′(i, j), i.e., d′(i, j) = w(i, j) + f(i, j). Because the capacity of the edge
between i and j is w(i, j), we know d′(i, j) ≤ 2w(i, j).
We will show that with this new disconnection cost d′(i, j) for every pair of nodes (i, j), s∗
is a stable solution. For any node j such that s∗j = fk with a positive demand, by the analysis
from Theorem 5.1, in a feasible solution of the circulation network, the total flow going into node
j equals to the total payments j needs to receive to be stabilized. By increasing the disconnection
cost from all i that pays j in the feasible solution by f(i, j), we increase the cost for leaving fk by
the sum of such f(i, j), so j is stabilized. For a node i with a positive supply in the network, the
supply equals the total flow going out of i, and agent i is stable with a total payment of Qi(s
∗) to
its neighbors and fk. If there is a flow of f(i, j) from i to j, then by converting this payment to
the increase of edge weight, i’s total social cost stays the same, so i is still stable.
5.2 Paying agents directly to stabilize s∗
In this section, we take on the role of a central coordinator, who is paying the agents in order to
stabilize the optimum solution s∗. We study the relationship between the Price of Stability and
the minimum total payments required to stabilize s∗. We use the notation of ∆i and stability with
payments defined in Section 3.1. ∆i represent the payment each agent i receives from the central
coordinator, and the total payments are ∆ =
∑
i ∆i.
Lemma 5.2.1. The following pricing strategy γ and payments strategy ∆ stabilizes the optimal
assignment s∗: For each facility fk,
Case 1. ∀i such that s∗i = fk and Qi(s∗) < 0, set γi(fk) = 0 and ∆i = −Qi(s∗).
Case 2. ∀i such that s∗i = fk and Qi(s∗) ≥ 0, set γi(fk) = Qi(s∗) and ∆i = 0.
Proof. To prove (s∗, γ) is stable and budget balanced, it is enough to show that every agent is
stable, and for each facility fk,
∑
i|s∗i =fk γi(fk) ≥ c(fk). If
∑
i|s∗i =fk γi(fk) > c(fk), then we can
always lower some of γi(fk) while keeping i stable.
First, note that in both Case 1 and Case 2, γi(fk) − ∆i = Qi(s∗). Thus, by Lemma 3.0.1,
every agent i is stable at state (s∗, γ) with a payment ∆i.
We now prove (s∗, γ) is budget balanced. Suppose to the contrary that there exists facility fk
such that
∑
i|s∗i =fk γi(fk) < c(fk). Then we close fk and let every agent i using fk in s
∗ switch its
strategy to BRi(s
∗). Denote this new assignment as sˆ. Because all other agents using BRi(s∗) in
s∗ stay at s∗, we know that c˜i(sˆ) is at most c˜i(BRi(s∗), s∗−i), i.e.:
c˜i(sˆ) ≤ c˜i(BRi(s∗), s∗−i). (4)
For every agent i in Case 1, because Qi(s
∗) < 0, by the definition of Qi(s∗):
Qi(s
∗) = c˜i(BRi(s∗), s∗−i)− c˜i(s∗) < 0
Combine it with Inequality 4:
c˜i(sˆ) ≤ c˜i(BRi(s∗), s∗−i) < c˜i(s∗)
Remember γi(fk) = 0 in this case, so:
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c˜i(sˆ) ≤ c˜i(s∗) = c˜i(s∗) + γi(fk)
For every agent i in Case 2, γi(fk) = Qi(s
∗), combine with Inequality 4 and the definition of
Qi(s
∗):
c˜i(sˆ) ≤ c˜i(BRi(s∗), s∗−i)
= Qi(s
∗) + c˜i(s∗)
= γi(fk) + c˜i(s
∗)
Thus, c˜i(sˆ) ≤ c˜i(s∗) + γi(fk) in both cases. Sum up all i such that s∗i = fk:∑
i|s∗i =fk
c˜i(sˆ) <
∑
i|s∗i =fk
c˜i(s
∗) +
∑
i|s∗i =fk
γi(fk)
Because we assume
∑
i|s∗i =fk γi(fk) < c(fk), so:∑
i|s∗i =fk
c˜i(sˆ) <
∑
i|s∗i =fk
c˜i(s
∗) + c(fk)
Only agents that use fk in s
∗ change their strategies in sˆ, so for every agent i such that s∗i 6= fk,
we have c˜i(sˆ) ≤ c˜i(s∗). Now consider the total social cost of state s: besides the costs change
between c˜(s∗) and c˜(sˆ), the total facility cost decreases by at least c(fk). Note that no new facility
will open in sˆ (compared to s∗) by the definition of BRi(s∗). Therefore:
c(sˆ)− c(s∗) ≤
∑
i
(c˜i(sˆ)− c˜i(s∗))− c(fk) < 0
This contradicts the fact that s∗ is the optimal solution. Thus, (s∗, γ) must be budget balanced.
In the following theorem, we show that the total payments ∆ required to stabilize s∗ is only a
fraction of the social cost of the optimal solution. Actually, there is a tradeoff between ∆ and PoS:
when PoS is large, e.g., PoS = 2, we only need to pay 15c(s
∗) to stabilize s∗, which is only a small
fraction of c(s∗). Thus when PoS is small, there already exist good stable solutions by definition of
PoS, and when PoS is large, only a relatively small amount of payments are necessary to stabilize
s∗.
Theorem 5.3. For any instance, ∆c(s∗) ≤ 1− 25PoS, where ∆ is the payment needed to stabilize s∗.
Before we prove this theorem, we define some extra notation. Let bi denote the strategy of
agent i such that c˜i(bi, s
∗
−i) is minimized. We can always find such a bi with either bi = ∅, or bi is
open in s∗. This is because if there exists b′i that minimizes c˜i(b
′
i, s
∗
−i) and b
′
i is closed in s
∗, then
it must be c˜i(∅, s∗−i) ≤ c˜i(b′i, s∗−i) because i would be the only agent using b′i. Then we define an
assignment bi for each agent i: start from s∗, only let agent i switch its strategy to bi and all other
agents stay at their facility in s∗, i.e., bi = (bi, s∗−i).
For any subset of agents A1 ⊆ A, let CCs(A1) denote the total connection cost for agents in
A1 in assignment s:
CCs(A1) =
∑
i∈A1
w(i, si)
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With assignment s, for any two subsets of agents A1 ⊆ A, A2 ⊆ A, define DCs(A1,A2) as:
DCs(A1,A2) =
∑
(i,j)|i∈A1,j∈A2,si 6=sj
w(i, j)
DCs(A1,A2) represents the disconnection cost between A1 and A2 in s. Note that (i, j) is still
an unordered pair here. DCs(A1,A1) represents the disconnection cost inside A1.
By the definition of Φ˜(s), we can rewrite it using the notation defined above as:
Φ˜(s) = CCs(A) +DCs(A,A)
Also, we can rewrite c˜(s) as:
c˜(s) = CCs(A) + 2DCs(A,A)
The following lemma gives a condition that would directly imply Theorem 5.3. We first show
this lemma, and then prove the theorem.
Lemma 5.3.1. For any τ ≥ 2, if there exists a state s, such that ∑i∈A c˜i(bi) ≥ 2τ Φ˜(s), then
∆
c(s∗) ≤ 1− 1τ PoS.
Proof. Consider the payment strategy ∆ defined in Lemma 5.2.1. We first prove that ∆i = c˜i(s
∗)−
c˜i(b
i). We discuss the two cases of agents in Lemma 5.2.1 separately.
In Case 1, Qi(s
∗) < 0. By definition, Qi(s∗) = c˜i(BRi(s∗), s∗−i) − c˜i(s∗) < 0. Remember bi is
the strategy to minimize c˜i(bi, s
∗
−i). Because c˜i(BRi(s
∗), s∗−i) < c˜i(s
∗), we know that s∗i does not
minimize c˜i if i is the only one allowed to change its strategy, i.e. bi 6= s∗i . By definition, BRi(s∗)
minimizes c˜i if i is the only one allowed to change its strategy, given a condition that i must leave
its current facility. Thus, bi = BRi(s
∗). Rewrite ∆i:
∆i = −Qi(s∗) = −(c˜i(BRi(s∗), s∗−i)− c˜i(s∗)) = c˜i(s∗)− c˜i(bi).
In Case 2, Qi(s
∗) ≥ 0, i.e., Qi(s∗) = c˜i(BRi(s∗), s∗−i) − c˜i(s∗) ≥ 0. Similar to the analysis in
Case 1, because c˜i(BRi(s
∗), s∗−i) ≥ c˜i(s∗), then it must be bi = s∗i , so:
∆i = 0 = c˜i(s
∗)− c˜i(bi).
Rewrite c(s∗)−∆ as:
c(s∗)−∆ =
∑
fk is open in s
c(fk) +
∑
i∈A
c˜i(s
∗)−
∑
i∈A
∆i
=
∑
fk is open in s
c(fk) +
∑
i∈A
c˜i(s
∗)−
∑
i∈A
(c˜i(s
∗)− c˜i(bi))
=
∑
fk is open in s
c(fk) +
∑
i∈A
c˜i(b
i)
Because we assumed there exists s such that
∑
i∈A c˜i(b
i) ≥ 2τ Φ˜(s), and τ ≥ 2, we have that:
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τ
∑
i∈A
c˜i(b
i) ≥ 2Φ˜(s)
τ(
∑
fk is open in s
c(fk) +
∑
i∈A
c˜i(b
i)) ≥ 2(
∑
fk is open in s
c(fk) + Φ˜(s))
τ(
∑
fk is open in s
c(fk) +
∑
i∈A
c˜i(b
i)) ≥ 2Φ(s)
τ(c(s∗)−∆) ≥ 2Φ(s)
Starting from assignment s, we apply the deviation steps and pricing strategy in Theorem 4.3.
By the analysis in Theorem 4.3, we will reach a stable state (sˆ, γ), such that Φ(s) ≥ Φ(sˆ) ≥ 12c(sˆ),
so:
τ(c(s∗)−∆) ≥ c(sˆ)
c(s∗)−∆ ≥ 1
τ
c(sˆ)
∆
c(s∗)
≤ 1− 1
τ
c(sˆ)
c(s∗)
≤ 1− 1
τ
PoS,
as desired.
With Lemma 5.3.1, to prove Theorem 5.3, we only need to find an assignment to satisfy the
condition in Lemma 5.3.1 with τ = 52 . We define several assignments s
0, s1, s2 below as candidates
that may satisfy this condition, and then prove that at least one of them must do so for every
instance.
Define the following state as s0: start from s∗, let every agent i switch its strategy to bi, i.e. s0i = bi.
We decompose all agents into two groups: A1 and A2, such that A1∪A2 = A and A1∩A2 = ∅.
The agents in A1 satisfy the following condition: ∀i, j ∈ A1, if bi 6= bj , then it must be the case
that bi 6= s∗j or bj 6= s∗i . In other words, it cannot be that by following their best responses, the
agents i and j “switch places”, with i moving to s∗j and j moving to s
∗
i . The same condition holds
for A2: ∀i, j ∈ A2, if bi 6= bj , then it must be the case that bi 6= s∗j or bj 6= s∗i . There always exist
such a decomposition for any instance: For every pair of facilities fk, f`, with k ≤ `, take all the
agents i with s∗i = fk and bi = f`. Put those in A1. Similarly, put all agents j with s∗j = f` and
bj = fk into A2. Do this for every pair of facilities, so now A1 consists of agents who are moving to
a higher-numbered facility, and A2 of agents who are moving to a lower-numbered facility. Finally,
for any other agent i such that either s∗i = bi or bi = ∅ or s∗i = ∅, put it in either A1 or A2
arbitrarily. The sets A1 and A2 which are created clearly satisfy the desired conditions.
Define the following assignment as s1: start from s∗ and let every agent i in A1 switch its
strategy to bi, while every agent i in A2 stays at s∗i . Similarly, define s2 as the assignment that
starts from s∗ and lets every agent i in A2 switch its strategy to bi, while every agent i in A1 stays
at s∗i .
Now we will show several lemmas based on the properties of A1 and A2.
Lemma 5.3.2. For any A1 and A2 that satisfy the definition above, these inequalities always hold:
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∑
i∈A1
c˜i(b
i) ≥ CCs1(A1) +DCs1(A1,A1) +DCs1(A1,A2)
∑
i∈A2
c˜i(b
i) ≥ CCs2(A2) +DCs2(A2,A2) +DCs2(A1,A2)
Proof. In assignment s1, every agent i ∈ A1 switches its strategy to bi, i.e., bi = s1i . Also, every
agent j ∈ A2 stays at s∗j , i.e., s1j = s∗j . In assignment bi, agent i is assigned to bi, i.e, bii = bi, and
any other agent j stay at s∗, i.e., bij = s
∗
j .
For every i ∈ A1:
c˜i(b
i) = w(i, bi) +
∑
j|bi 6=s∗j
w(i, j) = w(i, s1i ) +
∑
j|bi 6=s∗j
w(i, j)
Sum up for all i ∈ A1:
∑
i∈A1
c˜i(b
i) =
∑
i∈A1
w(i, s1i ) +
∑
i∈A1
∑
j|bi 6=s∗j
w(i, j)
≥
∑
i∈A1
w(i, s1i ) +
∑
(i,j)|i,j∈A1,bi 6=s∗j∨bj 6=s∗i
w(i, j) +
∑
(i,j)|i∈A1,j∈A2,bi 6=s∗j
w(i, j)
For all agents i, j ∈ A1, remember the condition that if bi 6= bj , then it must be bi 6= s∗j or
bj 6= s∗i . This means {(i, j)|i, j ∈ A1, s1i 6= s1j} = {(i, j)|i, j ∈ A1, bi 6= bj} ⊆ {(i, j)|i, j ∈ A1, bi 6=
s∗j ∨ s∗i 6= bj}, so we can bound the inequality above by:
∑
i∈A1
c˜i(b
i) ≥
∑
i∈A1
w(i, s1i ) +
∑
(i,j)|i,j∈A1,bi 6=s∗j∨bj 6=s∗i
w(i, j) +
∑
(i,j)|i∈A1,j∈A2,bi 6=s∗j
w(i, j)
≥
∑
i∈A1
w(i, s1i ) +
∑
(i,j)|i,j∈A1,s1i 6=s1j
w(i, j) +
∑
(i,j)|i∈A1,j∈A2,s1i 6=s1j
w(i, j)
= CCs1(A1) +DCs1(A1,A1) +DCs1(A1,A2)
The bound for agents in A2 can be proved similarly.
By our construction of A1 and A2, if there is a pair of agents (i, j) such that bi 6= bj , bi = s∗j ,
and bj = s
∗
i , then it must be that one of i, j is in A1, and the other one is in A2. We denote the
set of such pairs of (i, j) as Z for convenience. Formally,
Z = {(i, j)|i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2, bi 6= bj , bi = s∗j , bj = s∗i }
Note that by definition, for any pair of agents (i, j) ∈ Z, it must be the case that i and j are
not at the same facility in s∗. Thus,
DCs∗(A1,A2) =
∑
(i,j)|i∈A1,j∈A2,s∗i 6=s∗j
w(i, j) ≥
∑
(i,j)∈Z
w(i, j) (5)
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We first show the following lemma to bound Φ˜(s0) and c˜(s0) by the sum of c˜i(b
i) and the total
disconnection cost between agents in Z in s∗:
Lemma 5.3.3. ∑
i∈A
c˜i(b
i) +
∑
(i,j)∈Z
w(i, j) ≥ Φ˜(s0)
2
∑
i∈A
c˜i(b
i) + 2
∑
(i,j)∈Z
w(i, j) ≥ c˜(s0)
Proof. By lemma 5.3.2, we know:∑
i∈A1
c˜i(b
i) ≥ CCs1(A1) +DCs1(A1,A1) +DCs1(A1,A2) (6)
For agent i ∈ A1, i’s strategy is bi in both s1 and s0, so the connection cost to these agents
are the same in s1 and s
0. Also, for each pair of (i, j) that are both in A1, the disconnection cost
between them is the same in s1 and s0. For a pair (i, j) such that i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2, we know i’s
strategy is bi in both b
i and s1, and j stay at s∗j in both b
i and s1, so s1i 6= s1j is equivalent to
bi 6= s∗j . Thus, Inequality 6 is equivalent to:∑
i∈A1
c˜i(b
i) ≥ CCs0(A1) +DCs0(A1,A1) +
∑
(i,j)|i∈A1,j∈A2,bi 6=s∗j
d(i, j)
Similarly, we can get the following bounds for agents in A2:∑
i∈A2
c˜i(b
i) ≥ CCs0(A2) +DCs0(A2,A2) +
∑
(i,j)|i∈A1,j∈A2,bj 6=s∗i
d(i, j)
Summing them up:∑
i∈A
c˜i(b
i) ≥ CCs0(A) +DCs0(A1,A1) +DCs0(A2,A2) +
∑
(i,j)|i∈A1,j∈A2,bi 6=s∗j∨s∗i 6=bj
d(i, j) (7)
By definition, Φ˜(s0) equals:
Φ˜(s0) = CCs0(A) +DCs0(A,A)
= CCs0(A) +DCs0(A1,A1) +DCs0(A2,A2) +DCs0(A1,A2)
The only difference between Φ˜(s0) and the right hand side of Inequality 7 is the last term. We
further decompose DCs0(A1,A2):
DCs0(A1,A2) =
∑
(i,j)|i∈A1,j∈A2,bi 6=bj
w(i, j)
=
∑
(i,j)|i∈A1,j∈A2,bi 6=bj ,bi 6=s∗j∨bj 6=s∗i
w(i, j) +
∑
(i,j)|i∈A1,j∈A2,bi 6=bj ,bi=s∗j ,bj=s∗i
w(i, j)
≤
∑
(i,j)|i∈A1,j∈A2,bi 6=s∗j∨bj 6=s∗i
w(i, j) +
∑
(i,j)∈Z
w(i, j) (8)
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Put it back to the definition of Φ˜(s0):
Φ˜(s0) ≤ CCs0(A) +DCs0(A1,A1) +DCs0(A2,A2)
+
∑
(i,j)|i∈A1,j∈A2,bi 6=s∗j∨s∗i 6=bj
d(i, j) +
∑
(i,j)∈Z
d(i, j)
Combine the inequality above with Inequality 7, then we have proved the bound for Φ˜(s0), as
desired: ∑
i∈A
c˜i(b
i) +
∑
(i,j)∈Z
d(i, j) ≥ Φ˜(s0)
We get the bound for c˜(s0) similarly. By the definition of c˜(s0) and Inequality 8:
c˜(s0) = CCs0(A) + 2DCs0(A1,A1) + 2DCs0(A2,A2) + 2DCs0(A1,A2)
≤ CCs0(A) + 2DCs0(A1,A1) + 2DCs0(A2,A2)
+ 2
∑
(i,j)|i∈A1,j∈A2,bi 6=s∗j∨s∗i 6=bj
d(i, j) + 2
∑
(i,j)∈Z
d(i, j)
Combine the inequality above with Inequality 7, we have proved the bound for c˜(s0):
2
∑
i∈A
c˜i(b
i) + 2
∑
(i,j)∈Z
d(i, j) ≥ c˜(s0).
Using the previous lemmas, we are now ready to prove Theorem 5.3.
Proof. By Lemma 5.3.1, to prove Theorem 5.3, we only need to prove there exists s, such that:∑
i∈A
c˜i(b
i) ≥ 4
5
Φ˜(s). (9)
We prove the conclusion by contradiction. Suppose there does not exist any state s to make
Inequality 9 hold.
By our assumption, Inequality 9 does not hold for s1:
∑
i∈A
c˜i(b
i) <
4
5
Φ˜(s1)
∑
i∈A1
c˜i(b
i) +
∑
i∈A2
c˜i(b
i) <
4
5
(CCs1(A) +DCs1(A,A))
∑
i∈A1
c˜i(b
i) +
∑
i∈A2
c˜i(b
i) <
4
5
(CCs1(A1) + CCs1(A2) (10)
+DCs1(A1,A1) +DCs1(A2,A2) +DCs1(A1,A2)) (11)
By Lemma 5.3.2:
4
5
∑
i∈A1
c˜i(b
i) ≥ 4
5
(CCs1(A1) +DCs1(A1,A1) +DCs1(A1,A2))
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Subtract both sides from Inequality 11, we get:
1
5
∑
i∈A1
c˜i(b
i) +
∑
i∈A2
c˜i(b
i) <
4
5
(CCs1(A2) +DCs1(A2,A2)) (12)
In assignment s1, for any agent i ∈ A2, it stays at the same facility as in s∗, so the connection
cost to these agents are the same as in s∗. Also, for a pair of agents (i, j) both in A2, because they
both stay at the facility in s∗, the disconnection cost between is also the same as in s∗. So we can
rewrite Inequality 12 as:
1
5
∑
i∈A1
c˜i(b
i) +
∑
i∈A2
c˜i(b
i) <
4
5
(CCs∗(A2) +DCs∗(A2,A2)) (13)
Similarly, by the assumption that Inequality 9 does not hold for s2, we can get:
1
5
∑
i∈A2
c˜i(b
i) +
∑
i∈A1
c˜i(b
i) <
4
5
(CCs∗(A1) +DCs∗(A1,A1)) (14)
Sum up Inequality 13 and 14:
6
5
∑
i∈A
c˜i(b
i) <
4
5
(CCs∗(A1) +DCs∗(A1,A1) + CCs∗(A2) +DCs∗(A2,A2))
3
2
∑
i∈A
c˜i(b
i) < CCs∗(A) +DCs∗(A1,A1) +DCs∗(A2,A2) (15)
By Lemma 5.3.3: ∑
i∈A
c˜i(b
i) +
∑
(i,j)∈Z
w(i, j) ≥ Φ˜(s0)
And we assume there is no assignment s that makes Inequality 9 hold, so:∑
i∈A
c˜i(b
i) <
4
5
Φ˜(s0)
Then combine the two inequalities above, we get
∑
(i,j)∈Z w(i, j) >
1
4
∑
i∈A c˜i(b
i).
We add 12
∑
i∈A c˜i(b
i) and 2
∑
(i,j)∈Z w(i, j) to the left and right hand sides of Inequality 15:
2
∑
i∈A
c˜i(b
i) < CCs∗(A) +DCs∗(A1,A1) +DCs∗(A2,A2) + 2
∑
(i,j)∈Z
w(i, j)
Remember from Inequality 5, we know DCs∗(A1,A2) ≥
∑
(i,j)∈Z w(i, j), so:
2
∑
i∈A
c˜i(b
i) < CCs∗(A) +DCs∗(A1,A1) +DCs∗(A2,A2) + 2DCs∗(A1,A2)
≤ CCs∗(A) + 2DCs∗(A1,A1) + 2DCs∗(A2,A2) + 2DCs∗(A1,A2)
= c˜(s∗).
It is easy to see if 2
∑
i∈A c˜i(b
i) ≥ c˜(s1) or 2∑i∈A c˜i(bi) ≥ c˜(s2), then there exists an assignment
better than s∗. We will get more conditions from this contradiction, and then finish our proof.
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If 2
∑
i∈A c˜i(b
i) ≥ c˜(s1), by above we get c˜(s1) < c˜(s∗). And every facility that is open in s1
must also be open in s∗: this is because in s1, every agent i in A1 switches its strategy to bi,
and bi is open in s
∗ by definition. So the total facility cost in s1 is no larger than that in s∗,
i.e., c(s1) < c(s∗), which contradicts the fact that s∗ is the optimal assignment. So we know the
assumption that 2
∑
i∈A c˜i(b
i) ≥ c˜(s1) must be false, so it must be 2∑i∈A c˜i(bi) < c˜(s1):
2
∑
i∈A
c˜i(b
i) < c˜(s1)
2
∑
i∈A1
c˜i(b
i) + 2
∑
i∈A2
c˜i(b
i) < CCs1(A1) + CCs1(A2)
+ 2DCs1(A1,A1) + 2DCs1(A2,A2) + 2DCs1(A1,A2) (16)
By Lemma 5.3.2:
∑
i∈A1
c˜i(b
i) ≥ CCs1(A1) +DCs1(A1,A1) +DCs1(A1,A2)
2
∑
i∈A1
c˜i(b
i) ≥ CCs1(A1) + 2DCs1(A1,A1) + 2DCs1(A1,A2) (17)
Combine Inequality 16 and 17:
2
∑
i∈A2
c˜i(b
i) < CCs1(A2) + 2DCs1(A2,A2)
In assignment s1, the agents in A2 stay at their facility in s∗, so the connection cost to these
agents are the same as in s∗. Also, for two agents (i, j) both in A2, the disconnection cost between
them is also the same as in s∗. So the inequality above is equivalent to:
2
∑
i∈A2
c˜i(b
i) < CCs∗(A2) + 2DCs∗(A2,A2)
Similarly, if 2
∑
i∈A c˜i(b
i) ≥ c˜(s2), we can get c˜(s2) < c˜(s∗), by the same argument as above, we
get:
2
∑
i∈A1
c˜i(b
i) < CCs∗(A1) + 2DCs∗(A1,A1)
Summing them up:
2
∑
i∈A2
c˜i(b
i) + 2
∑
i∈A2
c˜i(b
i) < CCs∗(A2) + 2DCs∗(A2,A2) + CCs∗(A1) + 2DCs∗(A1,A1)
2
∑
i∈A
c˜i(b
i) < CCs∗(A) + 2DCs∗(A1,A1) + 2DCs∗(A2,A2)
Add 2DCs∗(A1,A2) to both sides:
2
∑
i∈A
c˜i(b
i) + 2DCs∗(A1,A2) < c˜(s∗)
Finally, combine the inequality above with Lemma 5.3.3 and Inequality 5:
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c˜(s0) ≤ 2
∑
i∈A
c˜i(b
i) + 2
∑
(i,j)∈Z
w(i, j) ≤ 2
∑
i∈A
c˜i(b
i) + 2DCs∗(A1,A2) < c˜(s∗)
Remember s0 is the assignment such that every agent i in A1 switches its strategy to bi, and no
agent switches to a closed facility in s∗ by the definition of bi. So the total facility cost in s0 is no
more than that in s∗. Thus we get c(s0) < c(s∗), which contradicts the fact that s∗ is the optimal
assignment. Thus, the assumption that no assignment s0, s1, s2 satisfies Inequality 9 is false, and
this proves the theorem.
6 Multiple Facilities per Agent
In this section, we consider the case that each agent is allowed to use multiple facilities. Most of our
results still hold in this setting, but with a constraint on possible deviations: when agents switch
their strategies, they are only allowed to drop from at most one facility each time, although they
can join as many new facilities as they want to. Most of our notation and proofs are similar to the
single facility setting; we include them here for completeness.
6.1 Model in the Multiple Facilities Setting
We are given a set of m facilities F = {f1, f2, . . . , fm} and a set of n agents A = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
An agent i can use any facility fk by paying a connection cost w(i, fk). A pair of agents (i, j) can
form connections through facility fk if they are both using fk. However, if i and j do not share
any facility that they are using, then both of them are charged a disconnection cost w(i, j). We
say a facility fk is open if and only if there exists an agent using it. There is a fixed facility cost of
c(fk) ≥ 0 for any open facility fk.
A facility assignment s = {s1, s2, . . . , sn} assigns the set of facilities that each agent uses: si
denotes the set of facilities that agent i uses in assignment s. In the case that agent i does not use
any facility, define si = ∅ and w(i, si) = 0. A pricing strategy γ = {γ1, γ2, . . . , γn} assigns the price
for using each facility fk to every agent i. γi(fk) is a non-negative number that denotes agent i’s
share of the facility cost for using fk. (s, γ) is a state with assignment s and pricing strategy γ.
Note that agent i only pays its share of the facility cost to fk if i uses fk, i.e., γi(fk) > 0 only if
fk ∈ si.
The total cost of agent i in a state (s, γ) is the sum of the following three parts:
1. If i uses facility fk, then there is a connection cost w(i, fk) to i.
2. For each agent j that do not share any facility with agent i, i.e., si ∩ sj = ∅, there is a
disconnection cost w(i, j) to both i and j.
3. If i uses facility fk, then there is a facility cost γi(fk) to i.
We denote the total cost of agent i as ci(s, γ). Sum up the three types of cost mentioned above:
ci(s, γ) =
∑
fk∈si
(w(i, fk) + γi(fk)) +
∑
j|si∩sj=∅
w(i, j)
We denote the cost of agent i without facility cost as c˜i(s):
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c˜i(s) =
∑
fk∈si
w(i, fk) +
∑
j|si∩sj=∅
w(i, j)
The total social cost of a state (s, γ) equals the sum of ci(s, γ), plus the total cost of all open
facilities. For each facility fk, the cost is c(fk) minus the sum of γi(fk) of each agent using fk, i.e.,
c(fk)−
∑
i|si=fk γi(fk). The sum of γi(fk) cancels out, and the total social cost is actually the sum
of c˜i(s) plus the sum of c(fk) of open facilities:
c(s) =
∑
fk∈F ,fk is open
c(fk) +
∑
i∈A
(
∑
fk∈si
w(i, fk) +
∑
j|si∩sj=∅
w(i, j))
=
∑
fk∈F ,fk is open
c(fk) +
∑
i∈A
∑
fk∈si
w(i, fk) + 2
∑
(i,j)|si∩sj=∅
w(i, j)
We consider (i, j) as an unordered pair, therefore in
∑
i∈A
∑
j|si∩sj=∅w(i, j), each unordered
pair (i, j) that si ∩ sj = ∅ is counted twice.
In this paper, we study the game where each agent’s goal is to minimize its total social cost,
and the central coordinator’s goal is to find a budget balanced and stable state (s, γ) that (approx-
imately) minimizes the total social cost. A state is budget balanced if each facility fk is fully paid
with the facility cost c(fk), formally:
Definition 6.1. A state (s, γ) is budget balanced if for each facility fk,
∑
i|fk∈si γi(fk) = c(fk).
In the multiple facilities setting, when agents deviate from their current strategies, they are
only allowed to drop from at most one facility each time, formally:
Definition 6.2. Given a state (s, γ), s′i is agent i’s valid deviation if |si\s′i| ≤ 1.
Before defining the stability of a state, we first define an agent’s best response and stability. In
this paper, an agent assumes it will be charged 0 facility cost for joining a new facility; see Section
3 for why this actually makes our results stronger than any other assumption, since if a stable
solution exists with this assumption, then it will still be stable if agents assume they would have
to pay a different cost. In other words, if an agent is stable when assuming it will be charged 0 for
joining some facilities, then it would also be stable with a higher cost.
Definition 6.3. Given a state (s, γ), s′i is agent i’s best response if for any valid deviation s
′′
i ,
c˜i(s
′
i, s−i) +
∑
fk∈si∩s′i
γi(fk) ≤ c˜i(s′′i , s−i) +
∑
fk∈si∩s′′i
γi(fk)
We denote i’s best response at state (s, γ) as BRi(s, γ).
Then we define the stability of an agent:
Definition 6.4. Agent i is stable at state (s, γ) if for any valid deviation s′i:
ci(s, γ) ≤ c˜i(s′i, s−i) +
∑
fk∈si∩s′i
γi(fk)
In other words, agent i is stable at (s, γ) if si is i’s best response at (s, γ).
We define a state (s, γ) to be stable if it is budget balanced, and every agent is stable:
Definition 6.5. A state (s, γ) is stable if it is budget balanced, and for each agent i, for any valid
deviation s′i:
ci(s, γ) ≤ c˜i(s′i, s−i) +
∑
fk∈si∩s′i
γi(fk)
26
6.2 Pricing Strategies and Stability
Remember a stable state (s, γ) is budget balanced, and every agent i is stable. Suppose there is no
other constraint on the pricing strategy, then we ask the following question in order to find a budget
balanced state: in an assignment s, how much facility cost can we charge an agent while keeping it
stable? Consider an agent i such that fk ∈ si. To see how much we can charge i without causing
it to deviate away from fk, we first define a special type of best response: with an assignment s,
let BRi(s, fk) denote i’s best response with regard to c˜i(s), given i is forced to stop using fk (and
forbidden to join fk again). If i does not use any facility in s, BRi(s, ∅) is just i’s best response with
regard to c˜i(s). BRi(s, fk) is agent i’s “next best choice” if i is forced to stop using fk. Intuitively,
the “value” of facility fk to agent i is how much i’s cost would increase if i is forced to leave fk and
join the next best choice BRi(s, fk). If there are multiple strategies that all satisfy the definition
of BRi(s, fk), we choose an arbitrary one except in one case: we never choose a facility set that
contains a closed facility in s as BRi(s, fk). We can always do this because if there exists such
strategy s′i, that s
′
i contains a closed facility f
′
k in s, then compare c˜i(s
′
i−{f ′k}, s−i) with c˜i(s′i, s−i).
The connection cost in c˜i(s
′
i − {f ′k}, s−i) is no more than that in c˜i(s′i, s−i), and the disconnection
cost is no less than that in c˜i(s
′
i, s−i), because i would be the only agent using f
′
k in s
′
i. So it must
be c˜i(s
′
i −{f ′k}, s−i) ≤ c˜i(s′i, s−i), then we can remove all facilities that are open in s′i but closed in
s to reach an assignment sˆi such that c˜i(sˆi, s−i) ≤ c˜i(s′i, s−i). We define BRi(s) = sˆi in this case.
Note that some agents might be unstable even with 0 facility cost. Thus, we also consider the
case that agents need to receive payments to be stable. If agent i uses facility fk in s, let ∆i(fk)
denote the payment that agent i receives if it does not deviate away from fk at state (s, γ), and
denote the total payments as ∆ =
∑
i
∑
fk∈si ∆i(fk). Then we define the stability with payments
as follows: a state (s, γ) with payments ∆ is stable if it is budget balanced, and for each agent i,
for any valid deviation s′i of agent i:
ci(s, γ)−
∑
fk∈si
∆i(fk) ≤ c˜i(s′i, s−i) +
∑
fk∈si∩s′i
γi(fk)−
∑
fk∈si∩s′i
∆i(fk)
For every agent i using facility fk in assignment s, define Qi(s, fk) = c˜i(BRi(s, fk), s−i)− c˜i(s).
We will show a condition that guarantees agent i is stable in the following lemma.
Lemma 6.0.1. Given any state (s, γ), agent i is stable with payments if it satisfies the following
two conditions:
1. For any s′i such that si ⊆ s′i (when deviating to s′i, i does not leave any facility in si),
c˜i(s) ≤ c˜i(s′i, s−i).
2. ∀fk ∈ si, γi(fk)−∆i(fk) ≤ Qi(s, fk).
Proof. First consider the first type of deviation s′i, in which agent i does not leave any facility, but
might join some new ones. In other words, the set {fk|fk ∈ si} is equivalent to {fk|fk ∈ si ∩ s′i}.
With the given condition:
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c˜i(s, γ) ≤ c˜i(s′i, s−i)
c˜i(s, γ) +
∑
fk∈si
γi(fk)−
∑
fk∈si
∆i(fk) ≤ c˜i(s′i, s−i) +
∑
fk∈si∩s′i
γi(fk)−
∑
fk∈si∩s′i
∆i(fk)
ci(s, γ)−
∑
fk∈si
∆i(fk) ≤ c˜i(s′i, s−i) +
∑
fk∈si∩s′i
γi(fk)−
∑
fk∈si∩s′i
∆i(fk)
Thus, agent i would not deviate to s′i such that si ⊆ s′i.
Then consider the type of deviation that agent i deviates to s′i such that si * s′i. Because agent
i can only leave one facility in each deviation, we will consider the deviation includes leaving each
facility separately. For any facility fk ∈ si, with γi(fk) − ∆i(fk) ≤ Qi(s, fk), by the definition of
agent i’s total cost:
ci(s, γ)−
∑
f ′k∈si
∆i(f
′
k)
= c˜i(s) +
∑
f ′k∈si
γi(f
′
k)−
∑
f ′k∈si
∆i(f
′
k)
= c˜i(s) +
∑
f ′k|f ′k∈si,f ′k 6=fk
γi(f
′
k) + γi(fk)−
∑
f ′k|f ′k∈si,f ′k 6=fk
∆i(f
′
k)−∆i(fk)
≤ c˜i(s) +Qi(s, fk) +
∑
f ′k|f ′k∈si,f ′k 6=fk
γi(f
′
k)−
∑
f ′k|f ′k∈si,f ′k 6=fk
∆i(f
′
k)
= c˜i(s) + c˜i(BRi(s, fk), s−i)− c˜i(s) +
∑
f ′k|f ′k∈si,f ′k 6=fk
γi(f
′
k)−
∑
f ′k|f ′k∈si,f ′k 6=fk
∆i(f
′
k)
= c˜i(BRi(s, fk), s−i) +
∑
f ′k|f ′k∈si,f ′k 6=fk
γi(f
′
k)−
∑
f ′k|f ′k∈si,f ′k 6=fk
∆i(f
′
k)
By the definition of BRi(s, fk), for any valid deviation s
′
i with fk /∈ s′i:
c˜i(BRi(s, fk), s−i) ≤ c˜i(s′i, s−i)
Also, because fk /∈ s′i and i can leave at most one facility at a time, so {f ′k|f ′k ∈ si, f ′k 6= fk} =
{f ′k|f ′k ∈ si∩s′i}. Therefore, i would not deviate to any s′i that i leaves at most one facility compared
to si. So every i is stable to any valid deviation.
In this paper, the default setting is that agents do not receive payments (∆i = 0), but we do
consider the cases that agents are allowed to be paid by their neighbors in Section 6.5.
6.3 Facility cost c(fk) = 0 for every fk
In this section, we consider the case that there is no facility cost, i.e. ∀k, c(fk) = 0. Set the pricing
strategy to be γi(fk) = 0 for any agent i and facility fk, then γ is budget balanced. In this setting,
for any agent i in assignment s, we have ci(s, γ) = c˜i(s). A state s is stable if for each agent i and
assignment s′i, c˜i(s) ≤ c˜i(s′i, s−i).
Define potential function Φ˜(s) as:
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Φ˜(s) =
∑
i∈A
∑
fk∈si
w(i, fk) +
∑
(i,j)|si∩sj=∅
w(i, j)
When an agent i switches its strategy from si to s
′
i, it is easy to see that the change of i’s cost
is captured exactly by the change of Φ˜(s), so Φ˜(s) is an exactly potential function.
Theorem 6.1. If ∀k, c(fk) = 0, then PoS is at most 2 and this bound is tight.
Proof. The proof is almost the same as Theorem4.1, with the potential function Φ˜(s) defined above.
We include the proof of this theorem as well as other theorems in this section in the appendix for
completeness, and only explain the difference between the single and multiple facilities setting in
the main body of this paper.
Theorem 6.2. PoA is unbounded in our setting.
Proof. The example in Theorem 4.2 also works in the multiple facilities setting.
6.4 Non-zero Facility Costs: Price of Stability
Same as in Section 4.2, we consider the general case that the facility cost c(fk) is a fixed constant
when fk is open. The only differences from Section 4.2 is that each agent is allowed to use multiple
facilities, and the valid deviation of an agent is defined in Definition 6.2.
We define potential function Φ(s):
Φ(s) =
∑
fk|fk is open
c(fk) +
∑
i∈A
∑
fk∈si
w(i, fk) +
∑
(i,j)|si∩sj=∅
w(i, j)
=
∑
fk|fk is open
c(fk) + Φ˜(s)
We will show that Φ(s) is an ordinal potential function when any agent i switches to a strategy
that decreases its cost without the facility cost.
Lemma 6.2.1. In an assignment s, if any agent i switch its strategy to s′i such that c˜i(s
′
i, s−i) <
c˜i(s) and s
′
i does not contain any closed facility in s, then Φ(s
′
i, s−i) < Φ(s).
Proof. The proof is exactly the same as for Lemma 4.2.1
Theorem 6.3. Suppose there is a central coordinator to determine γ. When agents deviate, they
can drop from at most one facility in each deviation, and are allowed to join as many facilities as
they would like to. Then PoS is at most 2 and this bound is tight.
Proof. This proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 4.3. We also define deviation steps that
converge to a stable state, with Φ(s) decreases in each step of the deviation. For each facility fk,
there are two cases:
Case 1, c(fk) >
∑
i|fk∈si Qi(s, fk). In this case, we close fk and let each agent i using fk
in s switch its strategy to BRi(s, fk). Similar to Theorem 4.3, we consider the cost of newly
disconnected pair of agents and newly connected pair of agents after closing fk. Because the
agents are only allowed to drop from one facility, which is fk in this case, so no agent would have
“unexpected disconnection cost” when it switches to BRi(s, fk) from other agents switching away
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from BRi(s, fk). The rest of the proof in this case is the same as in the single facility setting, with
modified notation.
Case 2, c(fk) ≤
∑
i|fk∈si Qi(s, fk). In this case, we consider pricing strategy γ, such that
γi(fk) = Qi(s, fk). First, no agent wants to deviate by only joining some new facilities, but not
leaving any facility. This is because every agent is stable without considering facility cost, and their
facility cost does not change if they do not leave any facility. By Lemma 6.0.1, for every facility fk,
every agent i would not deviate away from fk with γi(fk) = Qi(s, fk). Thus, every agent is stable
at (s, γ). The rest of the proof is the same as in the single facility setting.
See the appendix for the full proof.
Theorem 6.4. There always exists an α-approximate stable state (sˆ, γ) such that c(sˆ)c(s∗) ≤ 2α .
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as that of Theorem 4.4, with the following potential
function:
Φα(s) =
∑
i∈A
∑
fk∈si
w(i, fk) + α
∑
(i,j)|si∩sj=∅
w(i, j) +
∑
fk∈F|fk is open
6.5 Agents paying each other
The assumptions in this section are the same as in Section 5.1, but in the multiple facilities setting.
We consider the case that agents can pay each other to stabilize the optimal assignment. Formally,
for a pair (i, j) with fk ∈ si ∩ sj , i can pay j up to w(i, j) to stabilize the current assignment.
In the optimal assignment s∗ with a pricing strategy γ, we will consider the stability of every
agent using fk. First, no agent could lower its cost by only joining some other facilities, but not
leaving any facility. Suppose to the contrary that there exists an agent i that can deviate to s′i
by only joining some extra facilities to lower its cost. Because i does not leave any facility, then
ci(s) decreases means c˜i(s) also decreases. Any other agent j’s cj(s) does not increase, because
the connection cost of j does not change, and disconnection cost does not increase. Also, agent i
would not join a facility that is not open in s∗ because being the only agent at that facility would
not benefit it, so the total facility cost is also non-increasing. Thus, in the assignment (s′i, s
∗
−i), the
total social cost is lower than that of s∗, which is a contradiction.
The above argument satisfies the first condition in Lemma 6.0.1. Thus, every agent i would
be stable if γi(fk) −∆i(fk) ≤ Qi(s∗, fk) for all fk ∈ s∗i . For a pair of agents (i, j) using fk in s∗,
suppose Qi(s
∗, fk) ≥ 0, and Qj(s∗, fk) < 0, which means we can get some payments from i while
keeping it stable, but j needs to be paid to keep stable at s∗, then we allow i to pay j to stop it from
deviating. i would not pay more than w(i, j), which is the maximum increase of i’s cost as a result
of j’s deviation. In this section, we consider the stability with payments defined in Section 6.2.
pij is defined the same as in Section 5.1, and ∆i(fk) =
∑
j|fk∈s∗i∩s∗j pji.
Theorem 6.5. If agents can connect to multiple facilities, and we allow agents to pay their neigh-
bors, with i paying j no more than w(i, j), then there exist γ and payments of players to each other
so that the resulting solution (s∗, γ) is stable, with s∗ being the solution minimizing social cost. In
other words, the price of stability becomes 1.
Proof. The proof is similar to Theorem 5.1, except that each agent is allowed to use multiple
facilities and the valid deviations are limited to leaving one facility each time. See the appendix
for the full proof.
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7 Computation of Optimum Solutions
In this section, we discuss approximation algorithms to calculate the optimal assignment in poly-
nomial time.
7.1 Single Facility per Agent
Theorem 7.1. If ∀k, c(fk) = 0 and each agent is only allowed to use one facility, then computing
the optimum solution s∗ is NP-Hard, but there exists a poly-time 2-approximation algorithm.
Proof. First, notice that this setting is a simple generalization of the multi-way cut problem, which
is proved to be NP-Hard [20], so this problem is also NP-Hard.
Next, we will show that this setting can be reduced to the uniform labeling problem. In the
uniform labeling problem, we are give an undirected graph and a set of labels. The goal is to assign
every node in the graph a label to minimize the sum of two costs: (1) there is a cost c(x, i) for
assigning label x to node i; (2) there is a separation cost c(i, j) for neighbors i and j with different
labels.
Given an instance of our group formation problem, we create a label for each facility, and create
a node for each agent. Assign the labeling cost between agent i and facility fk as the connection
cost w(i, fk). Also, for each pair of agents i, j such that w(i, j) > 0, create an edge between node i
and j, and assign the separation cost between them as 2w(i, j). In addition, create a personal label
for each agent which corresponds to this agent not joining any facility: this label would have cost 0
for this agent, but a very large cost for all other agents. Using this reduction, it is easy to see that
our group formation problem can by solved by converting it to a uniform labeling problem while
preserving the approximation factor, and there is a known 2-approximation algorithm for uniform
labeling which runs in polynomial time [28].
Although there is a polynomial time algorithm that gives a 2-approximation to the optimal
solution when the facility costs are 0, the optimal solution is much harder to approximate in the
case that facilities costs are not all 0. Consider a weaker setting where all the disconnection costs
are 0: then our problem is equivalent to the general facility location problem. [26] gives a O(log n)-
approximation algorithm to this problem and shows that it is harder than the set cover problem,
which means it is inapproximable to better than Ω(log n) unless P=NP. We will show that in our
setting, when the facility costs are arbitrary, and even if the agents are allowed to use multiple
facilities, there still exists a polynomial time algorithm that gives a O(log n)-approximation.
7.2 Multiple Facilities per Agent
In this section, we assume each agent is allowed to use multiple facilities, and show that there exist
polynomial time algorithms that give a min{O(log n),m+ 1}-approximation with high probability.
We first model this problem by an integer program and then relax it to a linear program. For
every agent i and facility fk, let variable xik = 1 represent that i uses fk, and xik = 0 otherwise.
Let wik = w(i, fk) be the connection cost. For each pair of agents (i, j), let variable xij = 1
represent that i and j are not connected via any facility, and xij = 0 otherwise. Note that (i, j) is
still an unordered pair here. Let wij = w(i, j) be the disconnection cost. For each pair of agents
(i, j) and facility fk, let variable xijk = 1 represent that i and j are connected via facility fk, and
xijk = 0 otherwise. Finally, let xk represent whether facility fk is open or not. Then, computing
the optimum solution s∗ is equivalent to the following integer program:
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minimize
∑
i,k wikxik + 2
∑
(i,j)wijxij +
∑
k c(fk)xk
subject to xijk ≤ xik ∀(i, j), k
xijk ≤ xjk ∀(i, j), k
1− xij ≤
∑
k xijk ∀(i, j)
xk ≥ xik ∀i, k
xijk ∈ {0, 1} ∀(i, j), k
xij ∈ {0, 1} ∀(i, j)
xk ∈ {0, 1} ∀k
(18)
Relax the integer program above to a linear program:
minimize
∑
i,k wikxik + 2
∑
(i,j)wijxij +
∑
k c(fk)xk
subject to xijk ≤ xik ∀(i, j), k
xijk ≤ xjk ∀(i, j), k
1− xij ≤
∑
k xijk ∀(i, j)
xk ≥ xik ∀i, k
0 ≤ xij ≤ 1 ∀(i, j)
0 ≤ xijk ≤ 1 ∀(i, j), k
0 ≤ xk ≤ 1 ∀k
(19)
Algorithm 1. Let x∗ik, x
∗
ij , x
∗
k, x
∗
ijk denote the optimal solution to LP 19. For all x
∗
ik ≥ 1m+1 , set
xˆik = 1, otherwise xˆik = 0. For all (i, j) and k, set xˆijk = min{xˆik, xˆjk}. Then for all (i, j), set
xˆij = max{0, 1 −
∑
k xˆijk}. Finally, for all k, set xˆk = maxi xˆik. Return xˆik, xˆijk, xˆij, xˆk as the
solution for IP 18.
Theorem 7.2. Algorithm 1 gives a (m+ 1)-approximation to the optimal solution of IP 18.
Proof. Algorithm 1 gives a valid solution to IP 18. First, all variables are either set to 0 or 1. We first
round all xˆik, then set xˆijk = min{xˆik, xˆjk}, so xˆijk ≤ xˆik and xˆijk ≤ xˆjk. xˆij = max{0, 1−
∑
k xˆijk}
guarantees 1− xˆij ≤
∑
k xˆijk. Finally xˆk = maxi xˆik, so xˆk ≥ xˆik is satisfied.
By the rounding in Algorithm 1, for all i and k, xˆik ≤ (m + 1)x∗ik. We will then compare x∗ij
with xˆij and x
∗
k with xˆk.
xˆij = 1 if and only if
∑
k xˆijk = 0, which means ∀k, min{xˆik, xˆjk} = 0, then it must be the
case that min{x∗ik, x∗jk} < 1m+1 . Because x∗ijk ≤ min{x∗ik, x∗jk} and 1 − x∗ij ≤
∑
k x
∗
ijk, we know
x∗ij ≥ 1−m× 1m+1 = 1m+1 . So xˆij = 1 only if x∗ij ≥ 1m+1 , and thus xˆij ≤ (m+ 1)x∗ij .
xˆk = 1 only if ∃i, xˆik = 1, which means ∃i, x∗ik ≥ 1m+1 . So x∗k = maxi x∗ik ≥ 1m+1 , then
xˆk ≤ (m+ 1)x∗k.
Because all the variables given by the rounding method in Algorithm 1 are at most (m + 1)
times the optimal LP solution, we have that Algorithm 1 gives a (m + 1)-approximation to the
optimal solution of LP 19, and 18.
Algorithm 2. Let x∗ik, x
∗
ij , x
∗
k, x
∗
ijk denote the optimal solution to LP 19. For each facility fk, we
apply correlated randomized rounding on all x∗ik as follows: first order all agents i by increasing
order of x∗ik. Without loss of generality, suppose x
∗
1k ≤ x∗2k ≤ · · · ≤ x∗nk. With probability x∗1k,
assign xik = 1 for all i. With probability x
∗
2k − x∗1k, assign xik = 1 for all i ≥ 2, and xik = 0 for
all i < 2. With probability x∗jk − x∗(j−1)k, assign xik = 1 for all i ≥ j, and xik = 0 for all i < j.
Finally, with probability 1 − xnk, assign xik = 0 for all i. Once all xik are assigned, for all (i, j)
and k, set xijk = min{xik, xjk}. Then for all (i, j), set xij = max{0, 1 −
∑
k xijk}. For all k, set
xk = maxi xik. Repeat this randomized rounding process for 4 ln 10n times, then assign xˆik = 1 if
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xik is assigned to 1 in any one of the 4 ln 10n runs, otherwise xˆik = 0. Assign xˆijk = min{xˆik, xˆjk}.
Assign xˆij = 1 if and only if xij is assigned to 1 in every single run. Finally, assign xˆk = 1 if xk
is assigned to 1 in any single run, otherwise xˆk = 0. Return xˆik, xˆijk, xˆij, xˆk as the solution for
IP 18.
Theorem 7.3. With high probability, the social cost of the solution given by Algorithm 2 is no
more than O(lnn) · c(s∗).
Proof. First we show that Algorithm 2 gives a valid solution to IP 18. All variables are either
set to 0 or 1. xˆik = 1 if xik is assigned to 1 in any single run, and we set xˆijk = min{xˆik, xˆjk},
so xˆijk ≤ xˆik and xˆijk ≤ xˆjk. xˆij = 1 if and only if xij is assigned to 1 in every single run, so
1− xˆij ≤
∑
k xˆijk holds, because when xij is assigned to 1 in every run, it means xijk = 0 for all k
in every run, then it must be xik = 0 and xjk = 0 in every run, so xˆik = xˆjk = xˆijk = 0. When xˆij
is assigned to 1, 1 − xˆij ≤
∑
k xˆijk obviously always holds. Finally, xˆk = 1 if xk = 1 in any single
run, so xˆk ≥ xˆik must hold because xˆik is also assigned to 1 if xik = 1 in any single run.
We will first show that in one run of the randomized rounding method in Algorithm 2, P [xik =
1] = x∗ik and P [xk = 1] = x
∗
k. For any agent i, the probability that xik is set to 1 is exactly
x∗1k + (x
∗
2k − x∗1k) + · · · + (x∗ik − x∗(i−1)k) = x∗ik. xk = 1 if and only if ∃i, xik = 1, so P [xk = 1] =
maxi{x∗ik} = x∗k.
xijk = 1 if and only if min{xik, xjk} = 1. By our randomized rounding strategy, P [min{xik, xjk} =
1] = min{x∗ik, x∗jk}. (Note: this is the key point which makes our correlated randomized rounding
strategy work. The rounding of xik and xjk is not independent, so it can never happen that lower
x∗ik gets rounded to 1 but higher one does not.) Thus, P [xijk = 1] = min{x∗ik, x∗jk}. Because
x∗ijk ≤ min{x∗ik, x∗jk}, P [xijk = 1] ≥ x∗ijk.
xij = 1 if and only if
∑
k xijk = 0, so in any single run of the randomized algorithm:
P [xij = 1] = P [xij1 = 0]× P [xij1 = 0]× · · · × P [xijm = 0]
≤
m∏
k=1
(1− x∗ijk)
≤
(∑m
k=1(1− x∗ijk)
m
)m
=
(
m−∑mk=1 x∗ijk
m
)m
Because 1− x∗ij ≤
∑
k x
∗
ijk:
P [xij = 1] ≤
(
m− (1− x∗ij)
m
)m
(20)
When x∗ij ≤ 12 ,
P [xij = 1] ≤
(
m− 12
m
)m
≤ 1√
e
When we repeat the randomized rounding process for t = 4 ln 10n times, if x∗ij ≤ 12 , the
probability that xij is set to 1 in every single run is at most
1√
e
t =
1
10n2
. Since there are n(n− 1)
pairs of agents (i, j), then the probability that any x∗ij ≤ 12 and xˆij = 1 is at most n2 110n2 = 0.1.
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When x∗ij >
1
2 , we will prove that P [xij = 1] can be bounded by a linear function ax
∗
ij for some
constant a. We have shown P [xij = 1] ≤ 1√e when x∗ij = 12 . By Inequality 20, when x∗ij = 1,
P [xij = 1] ≤ 1. As a function of x∗ij , the right-hand side of Inequality 20 is strictly increasing and
convex. Therefore, this formula can be upper bounded by a linear function passing through the
points (12 ,
1√
e
) and (1, 1), which means:
P [xij = 1] ≤ 2(1− 1√
e
)x∗ij +
2√
e
− 1
When x∗ij ∈ [12 , 1], the right hand side of the above inequality is at most 2√ex∗ij , so:
P [xij = 1|x∗ij >
1
2
] ≤ 2√
e
x∗ij
Let A denote the event that there exist a pair (i, j) such that x∗ij ≤ 12 and xˆij = 1 (xij set to 1
in every single run). By our analysis earlier, P [A] ≤ 0.1. Let sˆ denote the assignment returned by
Algorithm 2. We will consider c(sˆ) with condition A and A¯ separately. First calculate the expected
social cost of sˆ with condition A¯:
E[c(sˆ)|A¯] = E[
∑
i,k
wikxˆik + 2
∑
(i,j)
wij xˆij +
∑
k
c(fk)xˆk|A¯]
=
∑
i,k
wikP [xˆik = 1|A¯] + 2
∑
(i,j)
wijP [xˆij = 1|A¯] +
∑
k
c(fk)P [xˆk = 1|A¯] (21)
In any single run, it is always true that P [xik = 1] = x
∗
ik and P [xk = 1] = x
∗
k, with any condition.
Remember xˆik = 1 if xik = 1 in any one of the 4 ln 10n runs, so P [xˆik = 1|A¯] ≤ x∗ik4 ln 10n. By the
same reason, P [xˆk = 1|A¯] ≤ x∗k4 ln 10n. Finally, we bound P [xˆij = 1|A¯] by further decomposing A¯
into two cases: x∗ij ≤ 12 and x∗ij > 12 . When x∗ij ≤ 12 , by the definition of event A¯, for every pair
of agents (i, j) that x∗ij ≤ 12 , we have xˆij = 0. Thus, P [xˆij = 1|A¯] = P [xˆij = 1|x∗ij > 12 ] ≤ 2√ex∗ij .
Apply these bounds to Inequality 21:
E[c(sˆ)|A¯]
≤ 4 ln 10n
∑
i,k
wikx
∗
ik +
4√
e
∑
(i,j)
wijx
∗
ij + 4 ln 10n
∑
k
c(fk)x
∗
k
≤ (4 ln 10n)(
∑
i,k
wikx
∗
ik + 2
∑
(i,j)
wijx
∗
ij +
∑
k
c(fk)x
∗
k)
= (4 ln 10n)c(s∗)
By Markov’s inequality:
P [c(sˆ) ≥ (20 ln 10n)c(s∗)|A¯] ≤ P [c(sˆ) ≥ 5E[c(sˆ)|A¯]] ≤ 1
5
Finally, we bound the probability that c(sˆ) ≥ (20 ln 10n)c(s∗) by considering event A and A¯
separately:
P [c(sˆ) ≥ (20 ln 10n)c(s∗)]
= P [c(sˆ) ≥ (20 ln 10n)c(s∗)|A]× P [A] + P [c(sˆ) ≥ (20 ln 10n)c(s∗)|A¯]× P [A¯]
≤ 1× 0.1 + 0.2× 1
= 0.3
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Thus, we have shown that with probability of at least 0.7, the social cost of the solution given by
Algorithm 2 is no more than (20 ln 10n)c(s∗).
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A Proofs in Section 6
The proofs for agents being allowed to connect to multiple facilities are almost the same as for the
setting where they can only connect to a single facility. We include the proofs of these results in
this appendix for completeness, and only explain the difference between the single and multiple
facility setting in the main body of this paper.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 6.1
Proof. With the above definition of Φ˜(s), when an agent i switches its strategy from si to s
′
i, it is
easy to see that the change of i’s cost is captured exactly by the change of Φ˜(s):
c˜i(s
′
i, s−i)− c˜i(s) = Φ˜(s′i, s−i)− Φ˜(s)
Thus, Φ˜(s) is an exact potential function.
The total social cost in this case is:
c(s) =
∑
i∈A
∑
fk∈si
w(i, fk) + 2
∑
(i,j)|si∩sj=∅
w(i, j)
Consider the assignment sˆ that minimizes Φ˜. sˆ must be stable, because the exact potential
function Φ˜ is minimized, so no agent could deviate to lower its cost. Bound the social cost of sˆ:
c(sˆ) =
∑
i∈A
∑
fk∈sˆi
w(i, fk) + 2
∑
(i,j)|sˆi∩sˆj=∅
w(i, j)
≤ 2Φ˜(sˆ)
< 2Φ˜(s∗)
≤ 2c(s∗)
Denote the final stable state as sˆ. Similar to the analysis in Theorem 4.1,
c(sˆ) ≤ 2Φ(sˆ) < 2Φ(s∗) ≤ 2c(s∗)
Thus, PoS is at most 2.
Consider an example with one facility and two agents. w(1, f1) = 0, w(2, f1) = 1−, w(1, 2) = 1.
The only stable state is agent 1 and 2 both do not use fk, i.e., si 6= sj . When  approaches 0, PoS
approaches 2.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 6.3
Proof. We define a deviation process that converges to a stable state, with Φ(s) decreases in each
step of the deviation.
Start with the optimal assignment s∗, if there exists an agent i that when i switches its strategy
to s′i, in which s
′
i does not contain any closed facility in s
∗ and c˜i(s′i, s
∗
−i) < c˜i(s
∗), then let agent i
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switch to s′i. Select another agent to repeat this process until no such agent exists. By Lemma 6.2.1,
Φ(s) decreases during each step in this process.
We know that no agent i can decrease c˜i(s) by switching to another valid deviation that does
not contain any closed facility in s. Note that even if i switches to a set of facilities that contains
a closed facility in s, it would not be able to lower c˜i(s). Suppose there exists a valid deviation s
′
i
that c˜i(s
′
i, s−i) < c˜i(s), then we can always create another deviation s
′′
i by removing all facilities
not open in s from s′i, and it is obvious that c˜i(s
′′
i , s−i) ≤ c˜i(s′i, s−i). This contradicts the fact that
no agent i can decrease c˜i(s) by switching to any valid deviation that does not contain any closed
facility in s. Thus, in this “stable” state, every agent is stable if it is charged 0 facility cost.
By Lemma 6.0.1, for any agent i that uses fk, we can charge a facility cost of Qi(s, fk) to agent
i while keeping it stable:
Qi(s, fk) = c˜i(BRi(s, fk), s−i)− c˜i(s)
=
∑
f ′k∈BRi(s,fk)−si
w(i, f ′k) +
∑
j|fk∈sj ,BRi(s,fk)∩sj=∅
w(i, j)− w(i, fk)−
∑
j|(BRi(s,fk)−si)∩sj 6=∅
w(i, j)
(22)
Remember BRi(s, fk) denote i’s best response given i is forced to stop using fk (and forbidden
to join fk again), while the assignment of all other agents do not change. In the multiple facility
setting, we assume each agent can leave at most one facility in every deviation. So if we compare
BRi(s, fk) with si, fk is the only facility that is in si but not in BRi(s, fk). For each facility fk,
consider the following two cases:
Case 1, c(fk) >
∑
i|fk∈si Qi(s, fk). In this case, we close fk and let each agent i using fk in s
deviate to BRi(s, fk). Denote the assignment after closing fk as s
′, then:
Φ(s′)− Φ(s) = −c(fk) +
∑
i|fk∈si
(
∑
f ′k∈BRi(s,fk)−si
w(i, f ′k)− w(i, fk))
+
∑
(i,j)|fk∈si∩sj ,s′i∩s′j=∅
w(i, j)−
∑
(i,j)|si∩sj=∅,s′i∩s′j 6=∅
w(i, j)
Note that only agents using fk in s change their strategies, and all other agents keep their
strategies at s. Thus, the newly disconnected agent pairs in s′ are at most those only share fk in s:
∑
(i,j)|fk∈si∩sj ,s′i∩s′j=∅
w(i, j) ≤
∑
i|fk∈si
∑
j|fk∈sj ,si∩sj=fk
w(i, j)
≤
∑
i|fk∈si
∑
j|fk∈sj ,BRi(s,fk)∩sj=∅
w(i, j)
The last line follows because by the definition of BRi(s, fk), fk /∈ BRi(s, fk). Therefore, if
si ∩ sj = fk, then it must be BRi(s, fk) ∩ sj = ∅.
Also, the newly connected agent pairs in s′ are created by the agents using fk deviating to their
BRi(s, fk), i.e.,
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∑
(i,j)|si∩sj=∅,s′i∩s′j 6=∅
w(i, j) ≥
∑
i|fk∈si
∑
j|(BRi(s,fk)−si)∩sj 6=∅
w(i, j)
With the condition of Case 1, we can bound Φ(s′)− Φ(s) by:
Φ(s′)− Φ(s)
= −c(fk) +
∑
i|fk∈si
(
∑
f ′k∈BRi(s,fk)−si
w(i, f ′k)− w(i, fk)) +
∑
(i,j)|fk∈si∩sj ,s′i∩s′j=∅
w(i, j)−
∑
(i,j)|si∩sj=∅,s′i∩s′j 6=∅
w(i, j)
≤ −c(fk) +
∑
i|fk∈si
(
∑
f ′k∈BRi(s,fk)−si
w(i, f ′k)− w(i, fk)) +
∑
i|fk∈si
∑
j|fk∈sj ,BRi(s,fk)∩sj=∅
w(i, j)
−
∑
i|fk∈si
∑
j|(BRi(s,fk)−si)∩sj 6=∅
w(i, j)
= −c(fk) +
∑
i|fk∈si
(
∑
f ′k∈BRi(s,fk)−si
w(i, f ′k) +
∑
j|fk∈sj ,BRi(s,fk)∩sj=∅
w(i, j)− w(i, fk)−
∑
j|(BRi(s,fk)−si)∩sj 6=∅
w(i, j))
= −c(fk) +
∑
i|fk∈si
Qi(s, fk)
< 0
Thus, Φ(s) does not increase after fk is closed and the agents deviate to BRi(s, fk).
Then repeat the above two steps: let agents switch strategies one at a time to reach a ’stable’
state s if all agents ignore the facility cost, then if there exist a facility fk that satisfies the condition
in Case 1, we close fk and let every agent i using it switches its strategy to BRi(s, fk). We repeat
these two steps until we reach state s that every agent is “stable” if all agents ignore the facility
cost, and every open facility does not satisfy Case 1. Note that Φ(s) decreases in each step, so
this process always converges to such an assignment s. Then each open facility must satisfy the
following Case 2:
Case 2, c(fk) ≤
∑
i|fk∈si Qi(s, fk). In this case, we consider pricing strategy γ, that γi(fk) =
Qi(s, fk). First, no agent wants to deviate by only joining some new facilities, but not leaving
any facility. Because every agent is stable without considering facility cost, and their facility cost
does not change if they do not leave any facility. By Lemma 6.0.1, for every facility fk, every
agent i would not deviate away from fk with γi(fk) = Qi(s, fk). Thus, every agent is stable at
(s, γ). Also, by definition, Qi(s, fk) = c˜i(BRi(s, fk), s−i) − c˜i(s). Because every agent is stable
without considering facility costs, so c˜i(s) ≤ c˜i(BRi(s, fk), s−i). Therefore, we are charging a
non-negative facility cost to each agent. By the condition of Case 2,
∑
i|fk∈si γi(fk) ≥ c(fk). If∑
i|fk∈si γi(fk) > c(fk), then to get a budget-balanced cost assignment, we can lower the facility
cost of some agents to make the sum of γi(fk) exactly c(fk), because the agents would not deviate
with γi(fk), then they would not deviate with a lower facility cost. Thus, we have reached a stable
state.
Φ(s) decreases in each deviation, so it is a ordinal potential function for our deviation processes.
The total social cost is:
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c(s) =
∑
fk∈F|fk is open
c(fk) +
∑
i∈A
∑
fk∈si
w(i, fk) + 2
∑
(i,j)|si∩sj=∅
w(i, j)
Denote the final stable state as sˆ. Similar to the analysis in Theorem 4.1,
c(sˆ) ≤ 2Φ(sˆ) < 2Φ(s∗) ≤ 2c(s∗)
Thus, PoS is at most 2.
See Theorem 4.1 for the lower bound example (assuming c(fk) = 0).
A.3 Proof of Theorem6.5
Proof. We construct a circulation network [29] for each facility fk as follows: start from the optimal
assignment s∗. Create a node for each agent i such that fk ∈ s∗i , and we set a supply of Qi(s∗, fk)
to it. (note that this value might be negative, in which case the node has a demand instead of
supply). For each pair of agents (i, j), we create directed edges from i to j and from j to i, both
with capacity w(i, j). Create a node fk with a supply of −c(fk) and and edge from each node to
fk with infinite capacity. Finally, create a dummy node z with a demand of the sum of supplies of
all other nodes, and add an edge from fk to z with infinite capacity. This is to make sure the total
supply meets the total demand in the network.
Suppose there is a feasible solution, then we can get the flow on each edge to create a stable
state: First, denote the flow from any node i to j as vij . For each pair of nodes i and j such
that fk ∈ s∗i = s∗j , set pij = vij − vji and pji = vji − vij . Also, for every agent i such that
fk ∈ s∗i , set γi(fk) = vifk . A feasible solution guarantees that facility fk is fully paid, because∑
i|fk∈s∗i γi(fk) =
∑
i|fk∈s∗i vifk = c(fk). Also, every agent is stable. First, by the definition of
∆i(fk) in this section, ∆i(fk) =
∑
j|fk∈s∗i∩s∗j pji =
∑
j|fk∈s∗i∩s∗j (vji − vij). For agent i such that
fk ∈ s∗i , the supply of node i is Qi(s∗, fk), which equals the total flow going out of i minus the total
flow going into i:
Qi(s
∗, fk) = vifk +
∑
j|fk∈s∗i∩s∗j
(vij − vji) = γi(fk)−∆i(fk)
By Lemma 6.0.1, every agent is stable with because ∀fk and i, γi(fk)−∆i(fk) ≤ Qi(s∗, fk).
This circulation network is feasible if and only if we can stabilize s∗ by allowing agents to pay
their neighbors. Also, the facility is fully paid for (budget balanced). By a standard Max-Flow and
Min-Cut analysis [29], if for any subset of nodes in the circulation network, the total supply of the
subset plus the total capacity of edges going into the subset is non-negative, then the circulation
network is feasible.
First consider any subset that includes z. If the subset does not include fk, then there must be
an edge with infinite capacity going into the subset, so the conclusion holds.
Next, consider a subset includes fk and z. If the subset does not include all agents in fk, then
there must be an edge with infinite capacity going into the subset, so the conclusion holds. If the
subset does include all agents in fk, then by the definition of z, the total supply is 0.
Then, consider a subset includes fk but not z. If the subset does not include all agents in fk,
then the conclusion still holds. If the subset is actually all the nodes in the network, then the total
supply is:
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∑
i∈A
Qi(s
∗, fk)− c(fk)
Suppose the total supply is negative instead. Then consider an assignment s′ that fk is closed,
and every agent i that uses fk in s
∗ switch its strategy to BRi(s∗, fk). For any agent j that does
not use fk in s
∗, j stay at s∗j . It it easy to see that c˜j(s
′) ≤ c˜j(s∗) for every j that fk /∈ s∗j . For any
agent i that fk ∈ s∗i , it must be c˜i(s′) ≤ c˜i(BRi(s∗, fk), s∗−i). This is because c˜i(BRi(s∗, fk), s∗−i) is
the cost that only i switches to BRi(s
∗, fk) with all other agents stay at s∗, while in s′ only agents
using fk switches their strategies. Because agents using BRi(s
∗, fk) in s∗ all stay at s∗, i would
not get any “unexpected cost” in s′, so c˜i(s′) ≤ c˜i(BRi(s∗, fk), s∗−i). Also, because fk is closed in
s′, the facility cost decreases by at least c(fk). No new facility will open in s′ (compared to s∗)
because we have excluded this possibility in the definition of BRi(s
∗, fk). Thus, the total social
cost of s′ increases by at most:
−c(fk) +
∑
i|fk∈s∗i
(c˜i(BRi(s
∗, fk), s∗−i)− c˜i(s∗)) = −c(fk) +
∑
i|fk∈s∗i
Qi(s
∗, fk)
By our assumption, this number is negative, which means s′ has less total cost than s∗, which
contradicts the fact that s∗ is optimal. Thus, the total supply must be non-negative in this case.
We denote BRi(s
∗, fk) as Ri for simplification in the following proof. Now consider a subset
of nodes does not include fk. Suppose there exists a subset B, that the total supply of nodes in B
plus the total capacity of edges going into the subset is negative, i.e.,∑
i∈B
Qi(s
∗, fk) +
∑
(i,j)|i∈B,j /∈B,fk∈s∗j
w(i, j) < 0 (23)
By the definition of Qi(s
∗, fk):∑
i∈B
Qi(s
∗, fk)
=
∑
i∈B
(
∑
f ′k∈Ri−s∗i
w(i, f ′k) +
∑
j|fk∈s∗j ,Ri∩s∗j=∅
w(i, j)− w(i, fk)−
∑
j|(Ri−s∗i )∩s∗j 6=∅
w(i, j))
=
∑
i∈B
∑
f ′k∈Ri−s∗i
w(i, f ′k) +
∑
i∈B
∑
j|fk∈s∗j ,Ri∩s∗j=∅
w(i, j)−
∑
i∈B
w(i, fk)−
∑
i∈B
∑
j|(Ri−s∗i )∩s∗j 6=∅
w(i, j) (24)
Decompose
∑
i∈B
∑
j|fk∈s∗j ,Ri∩s∗j=∅w(i, j) into two parts:∑
i∈B
∑
j|fk∈s∗j ,Ri∩s∗j=∅
w(i, j) =
∑
i∈B
(
∑
j∈B,fk∈s∗j ,Ri∩s∗j=∅
w(i, j) +
∑
j /∈B,fk∈s∗j ,Ri∩s∗j=∅
w(i, j))
=
∑
i∈B
∑
j∈B,Ri∩s∗j=∅
w(i, j) +
∑
i∈B
∑
j /∈B,fk∈s∗j ,Ri∩s∗j=∅
w(i, j)
=
∑
i∈B
∑
j∈B,Ri∩s∗j=∅
w(i, j) +
∑
(i,j)|i∈B,j /∈B,fk∈s∗j ,Ri∩s∗j=∅
w(i, j)
≥ 2
∑
(i,j)|i∈B,j∈B,Ri∩Rj=∅
w(i, j) +
∑
(i,j)|i∈B,j /∈B,fk∈s∗j ,Ri∩s∗j=∅
w(i, j)
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Remember we only create nodes for every agent j that s∗j = fk, and B is a subset of the nodes,
so {j ∈ B, fk ∈ s∗j , Ri ∩ s∗j = ∅} = {j ∈ B, Ri ∩ s∗j = ∅} in the first line of the inequality above.
The last line of the inequality above follows because by the definition of Rj , because fk /∈ Ri, and
an agent can only leave one facility when it deviates, so Rj includes all facilities in s
∗ except fk.
Thus, {Ri ∩Rj = ∅} ⊆ {Ri ∩ s∗j = ∅}.
Together with Inequality 23 and 24,∑
i∈B
∑
f ′k∈Ri−s∗i
w(i, f ′k) + 2
∑
(i,j)|i∈B,j∈B,Ri∩Rj=∅
w(i, j) +
∑
(i,j)|i∈B,j /∈B,fk∈s∗j ,Ri∩s∗j=∅
w(i, j)
−
∑
i∈B
w(i, fk)−
∑
i∈B
∑
j|(Ri−s∗i )∩s∗j 6=∅
w(i, j) +
∑
(i,j)|i∈B,j /∈B,fk∈s∗j
w(i, j) < 0
∑
i∈B
∑
f ′k∈Ri−s∗i
w(i, f ′k) + 2
∑
(i,j)|i∈B,j∈B,Ri∩Rj=∅
w(i, j) + 2
∑
(i,j)|i∈B,j /∈B,fk∈s∗j ,Ri∩s∗j=∅
w(i, j)
<
∑
i∈B
w(i, fk) +
∑
i∈B
∑
j|(Ri−s∗i )∩s∗j 6=∅
w(i, j) (25)
The inequality above follows because {(i, j)|i ∈ B, j /∈ B, fk ∈ s∗j , Ri ∩ s∗j = ∅} ⊆ {(i, j)|i ∈
B, j /∈ B, fk ∈ s∗j}.
Consider an assignment s′: start from s∗, let every agent i in B switches to BRi(s∗, fk). The
total facility cost of s′ is no more than in s∗ because no agent would switch to a closed facility in
s∗ by the definition of BRi(s∗). The total connection and disconnection cost in s′ compared to s∗
increases by at most the left hand side of Inequality 25, and decreases by the right hand side of it.
Then the total social cost of s′ is less than s∗, which is a contradiction, so such subset B does not
exist.
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